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Abstract 
One recurrent theme characteristic of contemporary antipoverty programs in the United 
States is the need for effective citizen participation and collaboration between the local 
community and representatives of the governing agency. How do some persistently poor 
rural communities gain resident and community cooperation for community based antipov-
erty programs? i review the shortcomings of programs aimed at overcoming constraints in 
development identified by neo-classical theory. I review the locality-based policy of the 
Clinton-Gore administration, the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative, which 
was structured to mobilize the local social infrastructure with tax incentives and grants as 
inducements for collaboration to neutralize, perhaps even reverse, historical exploitative 
practices. Of the 33 persistently poor communities involved in round one of the initiative, f 
have selected the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone (EZ} to assess the impact of lo-
cality based development initiative through the dynamics of legacy (internal colonialism) and 
social disorganization. I examine the relationship between practices of legacy (decision-
making structure: formation and composition of the governing body; meeting location and 
hour), social organization (community engagement: outreach attitudes and activities}, and 
the implementation of development goals (citizen participation and community-based part-
nerships). 
Introduction 
This thesis is based upon research that I conducted as a master's student in sociol-
ogy and industrial relations. My research agenda was less an obligation than a personal 
interest. I am aMexican-American born and raised in South Texas in the Rio Grande Val-
ley. I have had ample opportunity to witness first hand the embedded and concentrated 
poverty in the area. I often found myself wondering what it was about this area that kept it 
from reaching its potential. After all, for as long as I can remember, I had heard federal, 
state and local public officials through various mediums speak about how economic devel-
opment would improve the quality of life for the poor. 
As a graduate student I had a research assistantship with the North Central Regional 
Center for Rural Development at Iowa State University. I eventually came to work on a re-
search team studying the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community initiative, and the Rio 
Grande Valley was designated as one of the Round 1 rural sites. As I began thesis prepa-
ration (thought that this would be a great opportunity to combine an academic study with a 
longstanding personal interest in the region. Two factors motivated my focus on the Rio 
Grande Valley: (1) its participation in the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community 
Initiative and (2) its historical background. The collision of an empowerment paradigm and 
locally vested interest grounded in historical legacies create an ideal environment to observe 
the dynamics of the development processes. 
Later, during three years living in Honduras and serving as a Peace Corps Volun- 
Leer, (continued work on this thesis. Every day as I worked on community development 
projects, I had ample time to reflect upon the framework and tighten my logic just a bit more, 
as it became more practical and useful in understanding similar historical processes and 
legacy in the Honduran context. 
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The internal colonialism and social organization framework addresses the historical 
processes and legacy as well as the access to and exchange of information that facilitate 
opportunity to address common problems. In this thesis I have pieced together the under-
lying logic of the framework first by presenting the internal colonialism concept and its emer-
gent cultural capital. I then link cultural capital to social organization and the underlying 
components of bonding and bridging social capital. I treat culture as an attribute of the so-
cial system (Hechter 1975, p. 35). In this context I define culture as "a body of knowledge 
common to a given community, which acts rather like a template (i.e. It has predictable form 
and content), shaping behavior and consciousness" within a community from generation to 
generation (Miraglia 2003). Figure 1 illustrates the process. 
Figure 1 
Internal Colonialism &Social Organization Framework 
/ Internal 
Colonialism 
Cultural 
Capital 
Historical Process-uneven development. 
i.e. cultural division of labor 
The sum of these conditions 
and structural process 
influence the community's 
cultural capital Community Involvement 
Outcome 
- t 
Abundance and type of intra-community 
and inter-community ties, formal and 
informal that facilitate the ability to 
address common problems. 
Culturally imprinting the very understanding 
of society and each citizen's role in that society. 
The failings of economic development policies with respect to persistently poor 
communities in the 1980s and 1990s illustrate the limits of models focusing on individual 
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behaviors.- -These includes theories of-chore, e~:pectancy, and human capita!, al! of which 
fit beneath the umbrella of neoclassical economic model of poverty (Sherraden 1991, p. 35). 
The number of distressed communities is intolerable. The demand for development 
assistance of one kind or other continues to grow. "And yet the ineffectiveness of the usual 
blueprint and social engineering method is becoming ever more obvious" (Ellerman 2001, 
chapter 10). The greatest shortcoming is not the type or the level of assistance, and neither 
is it the commitment of development institutions or policy makers. Rather the greatest 
shortcoming is found in our development policies and associated implementation strategies 
that in themselves fail to encourage sincere citizen participation. Our strategies have pre-
dominantly failed to help people to help themselves regardless of how much official and un-
official rhetoric to the contrary, because we simply have not invited real community partici-
pation. in fact our policies' implementation strategies have had a propensity for making cir-
cumstances far worse, however inadvertently. 
Compelling critiques from development professionals, academics, grassroots leaders 
and some policy makers continue mounting, driven by conceptual and empirical flaws in the 
economic development policy that stem from the individual focus of the neoclassical eco-
nomic model. These critiques have led to new models in research and policy implementa-
tion, thus laying the foundations for a more integrative development paradigm with respect 
to persistently poor communities. 
One recurrent theme characteristic of contemporary antipoverty programs in the 
United States is the need for effective citizen participation and collaboration between the 
local community and representatives of governing agencies. How do some persistently poor 
rural communities gain resident and community cooperation for community based antipov-
erty programs? In this paper I review one recent development policy and use it to illustrate 
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the potential of a locality-based poverty reduction program as a feasible integrative devel-
opment strategy alternative. 
The Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community initiative prepared and initiated by 
the Clinton-Gore administration and continued under the Bush-Cheney administration is 
clearly alocality-based policy. The goals underlying the EZ/EC initiative are "to create self 
sustaining, long-term economic development in areas of pervasive poverty, unemployment 
and general distress, and to demonstrate how distressed communities can achieve self suf-
ficiency through innovative and comprehensive strategic plans that are developed and im-
plemented by alliance among private, public, and nonprofit entities" (Aigner, et al, 1999). 
This paper is based on findings from interviews conducted in the Rio Grande Valley 
Empowerment Zone. It is part of a larger effort consisting of data gathered about each par-
ticipating community, in a cooperative agreement between the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) and the North Central Regional Center for Rural Development. 
A critique: Neoclassical Economic Model of Poverty 
Over the last few decades critics have questioned the ability of economic growth to 
improve the circumstances of the poor and or distressed communities. The War on Poverty 
outlined alternative processes for alleviating poverty. The foundation of the program re-
volved around targeted interventions, such as improved formal and vocational education, 
improved public and individual healthcare, and community development initiatives designed 
to increase the earning potential of the poor within distressed communities (Leblanc 2001). 
Regardless of a few such holistic efforts, the fact remains that poverty-alleviating policies 
have continued to treat economic growth as the best and most effective effective approach 
to reduce poverty. Critics condemn economic growth as the exclusive strategy for poverty 
reduction and advocate for special programs targeting disadvantaged groups (Leblanc 
2001). Yet pure economic growth, as advocated by market-based policies as well as the 
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special programs targeting disadvantaged groups such as income transfer programs, fails to 
include community participation to create a shared vision of future. These policies also fail to 
view poverty outside the parameters of income or consumer potential. Thus their outlook 
and conceptualization continues to focus on behavior of the individual as opposed to a 
community approach. 
The focus on individual behavior emerges from theories embedded in rational choice 
and human capital categorized under the umbrella of the neoclassical economic model 
(Sherraden 1991, p. 35). Defined loosely, the Neoclassical Economic model "assumes that 
individuals are free to make decisions on their own in an open market of choices" (Sher-
raden 1991, p. 35). This effectively constitutes aself-deterministic perspective. The princi-
ples on which the model rests are: (1) perfect competition and information; and (2) perfect 
rationality and profit maximizing behavior. The social order arises from interactions carried 
out by utility-maximizing individuals. 
Critiques have been launched by an assortment of disciplines. Organizational be-
haviorists, for instance, have attacked the assumption of perfect rationality and pure profit 
maximizing behavior that underlies the neoclassical economic model. The critics point to 
the cognitive limitations faced by social actors individually, as well as the potential restraints 
imposed by organizations. Both cognitive limitation and organizational restraint arrest the 
likelihood of rational choice. In order to optimize and maximize behavior, cognitive limitation 
and organizational restraints tend to force the social actor more and more to adapt versus 
optimize and satisfy versus maximize. 
Neo-institutional theorists offer an institutional perspective. They stress that the so-
cial actor "may not act individualistically" because of existing rules embedded and fostered 
in the institution. Therefore, the social actor's "tastes and preferences are neither exoge-
nous nor independent, which means that utility functions" are inherently interdependent 
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(Bunea 2001, p. 7). Consequently the entrenched "methodological individualism" embedded 
in the idea of decisions made without the slightest consideration for group behavior or insti-
tutional influence severely restrict the model's policy recommendations. Policy emerging 
strictly from "methodological individualism" fails to appreciate the role norms play in policy 
implementation. 
The neoclassical model treats development with an outside-in process, with the be-
haviors of the social actors exclusively influenced by exterior variables. The inevitable 
shortcoming of such treatment is that "economic gains (profit maximization, efficient alloca-
tion of resources) are seen as ends in themselves, while the individual is seen as the means 
toward greater gains" (Bunea 2001, p. 16). Equally alarming, the model dismisses account-
ability through its exclusive focus on the markets' singular tendency to seek efficiency. The 
market, according to the basic tenets of the neoclassical model, will sort out issues of re-
source allocation simply through pricing mechanisms and naturally progress to a point of 
equilibrium, rendering the individual's responsibility as practically nonexistent. "When it 
comes to derived policies that deal with economic development (a matter that involves prin-
cipally -human beings}, this view is utterly simplistic and even destructive" (Bunea 2001, p. 
16). 
Another weakness in terms of policy is the model's overly optimistic perspective that 
social inequalities may be mitigated through the market system's free trade and competition. 
"But in fact market systems function very well to reproduce whatever social relations happen 
to exist; market institutions would therefore effectively reproduce coercive social relations if 
these are prior to a transformation" (Bunea 2001, p. 22). And thus the neoclassic model, in 
terms of development policy, effectively fails to grasp issues of equity and poverty. The 
model's treatment of development operates without adequate explanation for the historical 
origins of those social structures that facilitate social behavior and cultural transmission. 
Consequently, the model fails to compensate for uncertainty and lack of developed institu-
tions. 
Uncertainty, social, economic, political and/or environmental, is the overwhelming 
feature in the diverse communities in which development policies are implemented. "Genu-
ine uncertainty occurs in and through real time and requires constant and ongoing adapta-
tion" (Bunea 2001, p. 22). If the social world is treated as an open system subject to social 
change, uncertainty and the associated adjustments become Durkheim-type social facts. 
Another common feature of persistently poor communities is the lack of institutional capital. 
Intentional behavior promoted by neoclassical model is contingent on the rules, relationships 
and resources dictated by the social structures. Consequently, institutions matter a great 
deal, such that they either disrupt or reproduce the social structure in which they are em-
bedded. This essentially fosters coordination and cooperation, or competition and, at times, 
social sabotage. 
Although the models propose that market systems will spontaneously produce effi-
cient institutions and thus advocate government minimalism, market systems in fact do not 
automatically produce efficient institutions. To the contrary, market systems that produce 
efficient institutions seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Given this "market fail-
ure", what role should government play? I view the government as necessary in the devel-
opment process as an initiator and guide. Awareness of the reality that "what kind of insti-
tutions are adopted and how change takes place" is greatly influenced by political decision-
making.. The government (federal, state and county) as the initiating and guiding body may 
facilitate the crucial process of building the necessary social stability and consensus for a 
given shared social change. 
Market forces are shaped by the society in which they are embedded. "Diverse eco-
nomic structures cannot be explained by a unilateral, undifferentiated market factor any 
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more than by an undifferentiated cultural factor. Context-specific factors have to be consid-
ered: they are the interstitial components of the social structure as they are #ormed and 
emerge historically in different societies" (Bunea 2001, p. 26}. In terms of development poli-
cies there is no single absolute way to successfully achieve development (poverty allevia-
tion). Rather it must be an integrative policy framework that considers the conditions or al-
lows the flexibility to accommodate specific locality norms and cultural heritage. We must 
push beyond narrowly focused models, such as those categorically cemented in neoclassi-
cal methodology, and operate from a point in which we embrace the reality that the market, 
the state and civil society influence each other, thus symbiotically creating or suffocating de-
velopment efforts. 
Economic Growth 
The majority of our development policies reflect a belief that economic growth alone 
will suffice to permanently reduce poverty in the United States (LeBlanc 2001). This reflects 
a type of social and economic determinism strongly influenced by neoclassical economic 
models. While economic growth is unquestionably important, it is only part of a strategy of-
fering targeted interventions that will reduce poverty over the long term. 
Consider, for instance, "the pursuit of economic growth through the creation of pow-
erful markets and a vibrant private sector, macroeconomic stability, liberalized trade, privati-
zation, and a minimalist state" as Economic Development Policy (Bunea 2001, p. 8). The 
narrow focus is insufficient on its merits alone to create the environment necessary for pov-
erty alleviation. Sustainable growth and development demand more than privatization and 
trade liberalization; they demand building social and institutional infrastructure, the transfer 
of technology and accountability (transparency), and active community participation. 
Regardless of policy interventions, policy focus remains almost exclusively on eco-
nomicgrowth. Economic growth may produce an immediate short-term impact in poverty 
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reduction (Leblanc 2001). However, the career and income opportunities produced through 
economic growth strategies do not often spillover to the less-skilled workers, who are the 
lowest paid workers. Incomes on the whole increase, but the increase largely benefits those 
who are not poor. 
Furthermore, our market-driven economy's behavior, fostered by growth strategies, 
causes the labor-market relationship to fall into predictable patterns that do not benefit the 
less-skilled labor force. Although businesses may choose to adopt alternative production 
strategies, forestalling capital investment in technology, the pressures forced by growth 
strategies pressure businesses to undertake low-end unit labor costs and cutback strate-
gies. Such strategies include lowering wages, reducing training and reducing permanent 
employees, and undercutting benefits such as health insurance and retirement pension in-
vestment. Potentially the business may relocate to low or lower wage states or other coun-
tries as a strategy to reduce costs. Whatever the labor cost-reducing strategy, the substan-
tial impact is diminished income-generating potential for the low skilled laborer, the working 
poor. 
Considerations and New Views 
During the 1980s and 1990s most development strategies focused on specific as-
pects of the development process. The policies focused on efficiency of resource allocation 
rather than its effectiveness. Shortcomings in the development process were treated as 
purely technical failures, and thus treatable via technical efficiency-based solutions. Unfor-
tunately such policies failed to change the social reality. The potential of participatory ap-
proach was ignored. 
Getting more financial efficiency at the expense of human lives is simply non-
sensical and misguided: the problem after all is not optimal resource alloca-
tion, but human welfare. Questions of efficiency are certainly important to 
economic performance, but the overwhelming stress on such issues reduced 
development to its narrow `economic growth' sense, which distracted atten-
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tion from institutional and grassroots issues, and contributed to the unfortu-
nate division of macro and micro development processes (Bunea 2001, p. 9). 
On the whole, it not surprising that the deterministic system of those neoclassical 
models fails to embrace the role of history and culture. "From Emile Durkheim onward, it 
has been noted that all market-based and contractual systems rely on non-contractual ele-
ments such as trust and moral norms to function" (Hodgson 1995, p. 756). For Etzioni 
(1988), purposeful rationality is unlikely, given that the majority of our choices are driven by 
values. 
Apparent policy shortcomings have forced the search for more integrative ap-
proaches to economic development and policy design. A broader framework of develop-
ment has begun to build, in which economic change and development are not the only ob-
jectives, but part of the development process. Consequently, a development strategy is 
viewed as a facilitator. It facilitates the identification of assets and barriers to social change. 
"For this reason, the new strategy seeks not just an increase in measured GDP, but an im-
provement of living standards (mainly health and education), sustainable development (pre-
serving natural resources and maintaining a healthy environment), equitable development 
(ensuring that all groups in society, not just those at the top, enjoy the fruits of develop-
ment), and democratic development (citizen participation in the making of decisions that af-
fect their lives)" (Bunea 2001, p. 9). 
In the wake of changing development strategy perspectives, the important role of 
civil society is increasingly recognized. Civil society brings the local community to the fore-
front. Local participation embodies commitment and the potential for sustainability. The 
recognition of civil society and local participation reflects an increasing appreciation for so-
cial and institutional infrastructure (norms, values and culture) as determinants of develop-
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ment. "The hard part of capacity-building is the development of organizational/social capital, 
including institutions that enable a society to function effectively" (Bunea 2001, p. 10). 
The Empowerment Zone/ Enterprise Community Initiative best exemplifies the shift-
ing focus from the exclusive economic growth factors of development policy toward amulti- 
dimentional comprehensive policy. 
EMPOWERMENT ZONE/ENTERPR/ SE COMMUNITY /NITIA TI VE REVIEW 
The Clinton/Gore Administration arrived at the Washington policy arena with an ap-
petite to change the top down approach characteristic of economic development, thus of-
fering citizens an active role in the decision-making process. 
President Clinton announced the Empowerment Zone/ Enterprise Community Initia-
tive in 1993 as an integral component of the Administration's community revitalization strat-
egy. Poverty-stricken areas in the inner cities and in rural America were eligible for partici-
pation as an after thought, and administration of the Rural EZ/EC program was given to the 
US Department of Agriculture. Community eligibility was limited to rural census tracts with a 
maximum of 30,000 residents in an area of 50,000 square miles and with a significant per-
sistently poor population. The persistently poor population, a criterion, is based on a poverty 
rate threshold' defined by the President's Community Enterprise Board. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture reviewed the applications from 220 rural communities and selected 33 
rural EZ/EC sites. 
The selection process was based on the four key principles of the EZJEC initiative. 
1. Economic opportunity, 
2. Sustainable community development, 
3. Community-based partnerships and 
' Nominated urban and rural areas must meet the following pervasive poverty and distress criteria: (1) 
must suffer from pervasive poverty, unemployment, and general distress; (2) must have a poverty 
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4. A strategic plan for change. 
Two of these key principles also define the primary outcome goals 
1. Economic opportunity and 
2. Sustainable community development. 
The umbrella of economic opportunity includes entrepreneurial initiatives, small business 
expansion, and job training for all residents. . Those efforts support and motivate jab creation 
and the potential of upward mobility. Knowing, however, that economic development can 
only be achieved as part of a more comprehensive development strategy, the EZ/EC initia-
tive mandates sustainable community development, the second outcome goal. The under-
lying idea was to empower communities through the support of "local plans that coordinate 
economic, physical, environmental, community, and human development" (U.S. Department 
of Agriculture 1993, p. 8). 
The remaining principles highlighted the processes of citizen participation in the for-
mation of locally defined strategic plans and community based partnerships in order to im-
plement benchmark activities that were necessary to reach the aforementioned primary out-
come goals. It was recognized that both economic and community development are inher-
ently contingent on community participation, and that community-based partnerships are an 
integral part of the initiative's focus. Community-based partnerships include local and state 
governments, government agencies, community groups, private and nonprofit organizations 
and educational institutions. The most important element is the residents themselves. The 
program was designed to facilitate the opportunity for the community to design and drive the 
development effort with support from the federal government. 
rate at or above: 20% for each census tract; 25% in at feast 90 percent of the census tracts; 35% in at 
least 50 percent of the census tract. 
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The EZ/EC was designed to empower people and communities through partnerships 
working together to create the opportunity for sustainable community and economic devel-
opment. The strategic plan reflects the shared vision for change, developed by community 
partners (community residents, citizen groups, the private and nonprofit sectors and local 
government). The plan presents the community's vision of what the community wants to 
achieve and the steps necessary to achieve it. Outlining the investments the community "is 
willing to make in revitalization and the commitments —financial and otherwise —from the 
private, nonprofit and public sectors", the plan establishes the framework to monitor and as-
sess the community's development effort (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1993, p. 6). 
After reviewing the 220 community applications, three sites were selected as 
Empowerment Zones2 and 30 sites were designated Enterprise Communities3. The three 
designated Empowerment Zone's met more of the eligibility criteria than the 30 designated 
Enterprise Community's. "The rural sites extend from the Eastern Shore of Virginia to the 
Deep South, from states which border Mexico to the Great Plains and the inland Northwest. 
As a group the 33 rural sites represent the range of geographic, economic, political and so-
cial conditions and structures that place the poorest at risk for permanent, stable poverty" 
(Aigner et al. 2001, p. 495). 
The Model Used For Review 
The psychological and sociological features related to circumstances of poverty dic-
tate an appreciation for historical processes. History generates some possibilities and ham-
pers others. Failure to consider historical processes and the emergent cultural capital 
greatly limits the implementation of the development process. To review the dynamics of 
the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community Initiative and the Rio Grande Valley, I 
2 Those communities designated as an EZ are awarded $40 million in social security block grant 
funds. 
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sought a model that sufficiently grasped the importance of history and the associated out-
puts. In this context i use the concepts of internal colonialism and social disorganization to 
highlight considerations necessary for successful development in distressed communities. 
By merging the concepts of legacy (internal colonialism) and social disorganization, (focus 
upon those structural conditions that influence citizen participation and thus development 
implementation. 
Legacy (how governing bodies are formed and their composition, where and when 
those bodies meet, etc.} influences the level of social organization (attitudes toward inclu-
siveness and outreach activities) and in turn influences community involvement in the im-
plementation of the development goals (citizen participation and community-based partner-
ships), as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
Legacy &Social Disorganization Model 
Legacy 
Historical Processes 
Composition 
Of 
Governing 
Board 
~ Snr•.ial nr~ani~atinn 
Outreach: 
Attitudes 
Activities 
Citizen 
Participation 
Implgmentatinn 
Com munit • wnership 
Community 
Based 
Partnerships 
This model yields a general hypothesis that the research attempts to test. 
General Hypothesis: The compositional characteristics of the governing body 
influence the level of outreach activity which in turn affects citizen participa-
tion/partnerships with respect to the implementation of the Empowerment 
Zone's goals. 
s Those communities designated as an EC are awarded $3 million in social security block grant funds. 
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To show how I derived the model, I review the concepts of internal colonialism 
(Chapter 1) and social disorganization (Chapter 2). I operationalize the concept in Chapter 
3 and present the historical landscape of the model with respect to the Rio Grande Valley 
(Texas) and its legacy as a result of international colonialism and the resulting social disor- 
ganization in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 includes my findings and conclusions. 
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Chapter 1. Internal Colonialism 
Over the years educational, political and economic institutions that artfully articulate 
and sell the idea that the free market is an open system consistently bombarded us with 
their rhetoric. They argue that the market system is such that disciplined and determined 
individuals create their own fortune and opportunity. The underlying assumptions are that all 
situations are equal, and that rational persons make rational choices. Consequently, devel-
opment programs tend to reflect that individual-based fixation toward exclusive economic 
growth. However, not all social, political and economic situations are equal. Some people 
and communities simply have access to more economic and political resources. Historical 
processes unquestionably play a role in the prevailing structural conditions of any given 
community, which greatly limit or foster access to education and opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes, etc. The sum of these conditions and structural processes in-
fluence the community's cultural capital and legacy. 
1 use the concept of internal colonialism to highlight the historical processes that in-
fluence the structural conditions that facilitate or stifle development programs aimed at so-
cial change. Understanding how structural conditions originate increases the likelihood that 
development efforts will address those dynamics influencing community decision-making 
processes and potentially help communities create a common vision. 
Internal Colonialism 
The internal colonialism theory highlights the uneven wave of development that cre- 
ates alegacy for developed and underdeveloped groups that form a society. The strength of 
the concept is that it forces us to contend with historical processes, especially development 
initiated by exogenous forces. 
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Figure 1.1 
Core &Peripheral Relationship 
Initial Phase of Internal Colonial Situation 
The initial phase is a situation in which the peripheral group is 
governed by the core politically and economically. 
In terms of development, the concept frames the exploitative relationships between the 
center and peripheral groups in a society at historical juncture. Typically the center group 
refers to an urban-governmental core where intense economic growth and decisions are 
made. The center initiates the relationship by asserting its superiority over the materially 
underdeveloped periphery. "The result of the exploitation between the center and periphery 
is an acute difference in the economic and social development between the two regions; the 
center becomes increasingly wealthier while the peripheral group faces growing poverty" 
and a structured legacy between the developed and underdeveloped group (Ong 2000, p. 
1). 
Internal colonialism is the development of underdevelopment (Frank 1978). Internal 
colonialism is a system of class exploitation, where the periphery is the subordinate class 
exploited for resources that are necessary for the continued economic growth of the center. 
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This includes extractable raw material and agricultural, as well as cheap labor. The center 
utilizes various strategies to conserve antiquated modes of production and social organiza-
tion in the periphery in order to preserve its vested interests. It unleashes efforts to create 
and maintain political stability as well as to legitimize and maintain the developed group's 
social and economic position. 
The Concept's Origin 
The concept's origin dates back to the late nineteenth century. It was first used to 
describe the class exploitation of Russian peasants. It evolved into a characterization for 
the economic underdevelopment of regions in Europe. Internal colonialism described the 
process of uneven development between regions. The unevenness is the result of market 
advantages or economic policies that have generated uneven distributional consequences 
(i.e. wealth, capital, access to markets) for regions. In the 1960s the concept was used to 
compare regions in terms of core and periphery. 
Pablo Gonzales Casanova (1965) and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (1965) used the inter-
nal colonialism concept in an ethnic-based historical context. The concept has repeatedly 
been used to address the state of Latin American countries, focusing special attention on 
the shared historical heritage, specifically the evolving political and economic relationships 
in Latin America shaped by the shared colonial history. The legacy of this common history 
has chiseled social, economic and political interests that favor skewed structural conditions 
that in turn restrain social change and retain the uneven development processes in place. 
The legacy directly associated to the lack of sovereignty is born out of the internal 
colonial arrangement. It fostered dependence in terms of development that severely stifled 
the underdeveloped peripheral group's economic welfare as well as cultural veracity. As 
policies poured forth from larger political arenas, the underdeveloped peripheral group lost 
the opportunity to determine its own fortune or misfortune. The burden of a larger cultural 
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division of labor took precedence to further the underdeveloped group's marginalized posi-
tion. This was manifested through explicit means. The favored roles and positions be-
longed to the members of the developed group, and thus control of the economic and politi-
cal apparatus remained fixed by them. For the underdeveloped group this ensured a per-
petuating position of relative poverty and isolation. 
Internal Colonialism's Process 
The concept's framework provides a structure by which the historical processes that 
have instigated social change through structural upheavals and institutional births and re-
births may be studied. It also helps in understanding the ensuing legacy. The perpetuation 
of this legacy leads to formation of an actual structural condition that secures the vested 
economic and political interest of the developed group. 
How then is the concept useful? It forces us to distinguish between development 
that comes about as a result of factors endogenous to the community and what transpires 
as a result of exogenous forces. Development based on exogenous farces in underdevel-
oped societies builds internal colonialism. The patterns of development characterizing the 
internal colonial situation are decidedly different from those that emerge from endogenous 
efforts. When development is externally imposed, the colonizers present themselves as 
culturally superior. 
The internal colonial situation involves contact between two regionally and culturally 
distinct communities (Walls 1978, p. 324). The developed community initiates the contact 
and asserts its superiority over the materially underdeveloped community. The developed 
community is the central group, and the underdeveloped community is the peripheral group. 
The ensuing relationship is equivalent to class exploitation. The peripheral group is ex-
ploited for the resources necessary for the continued economic growth of the center. The 
cultural contact engendered in the internal colonial situation does not lead to equal social 
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and economic development between the center and peripheral group. The dominated pe-
ripheral group is relegated to an instrumental role and viewed as culturally inferior. 
The center practices discrimination against the culturally distinct peripheral 
group by implementing processes designed to reinforce cultural inferiority of the peripheral 
group (Havens and Flinn 1970, p. 11). The center group manufactures and manipulates 
values and beliefs necessary to legitimize and secure its social and economic position (Shits 
1975, p. 3). The value system imposed reflects the center group's interest to undermine 
threats to its authority through legitimization of its position. The relationship is based on the 
center group's institutional articulation of its values and beliefs. 
The school system constructed by Texas farm settlers to educate (separately) the 
Mexican children in the late 1920s highlights the process. The farm settler community gen-
erally agreed that the Mexican was not a legitimate citizen of the United States (Montejano 
1999, p. 181). For the farm settlers the Mexican represented an inferior race. The farm set-
tlers understood the threat to the preservation of their social and economic position in the 
divided community if they allowed Mexicans access to similar education. They believed that 
education might lead the Mexican community to seek social equality. Consequently, the 
farm settler community produced the segregationist policies necessary to justify the sub-
standard and inadequate Mexican school system. This resulted in a Mexican school system 
that taught the Mexican community of their culture's inferiority and low place in society. 
Authorities justified practices and decisions made regarding the Mexican school situation on 
the basis of inherent inferiority. 
Education more directly threatened the farmer's ability to secure and control farm la-
bor. Educational policy therefore was influenced by the needs of the farm settlers. The 
farm settler community was not motivated to educate the Mexican community, given the 
potential future demands for better wages and working conditions. If farmers were to protect 
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their labor supply, the Mexican community had to be kept uneducated. If the exogenous 
development initiated by the Anglo farm settler were to continue, education that might un-
dermine the interest of the those in control would not be permitted. 
This example brings us to the major component of the internal colonial situation —the 
existence of a cultural division. The division initially is determined by timing and circum-
stances and marked by the community's encounter with industrialization (Peled 2000). The 
center was the first to industrialize. The center therefore occupies the primary role in the 
cultural division of labor as initiators. In contrast, the peripheral group finds the development 
process imposed on their community, and, dominated, falls into the subservient role. Over 
the years, ..."the task of perpetuating the structure of inequality falls to ideas about cultural 
and racial differences" (Verdery 1979, p. 378). The cultural division that develops retards 
participation in the economy and decision-making processes for those of the underdevel-
oped peripheral community. 
The cultural division of labor is instituted and promoted through policy intervention 
that facilitates or denies access to institutions that deliver social and economic potential. 
The more pronounced the cultural division of labor, the more likely it becomes that members 
of the peripheral group will withdraw from the larger society. The rigidity of the cultural divi-
sion of labor limits the degree of interaction between groups and determines its form. 
The construction and implementation of this system of stratification based on cultural 
distinctions and class order is adjustable according to the needs of the center group. Pres-
tigious occupations are reserved for members of the center group. Similarly access to credit 
and lending practices follow affiliation to the center group. The center monopolizes basic 
economic processes, such as professional growth, entrepreneurship and financial capital, to 
uphold the center group's social and economic position. 
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In an internal colonial situation, the center views the peripheral community's emerg-
ing economy or development as a complementary appendage to the center's interest and 
economic needs. It is based on an extractive economic process, which funnels resources 
from the periphery to the center. The process uses price mechanisms and fiscal transfers 
(Love 1989, p. 905). It is an unequal distribution of income and employment between the 
center-periphery groups (Peluso et al. 1994, p. 32). The complementary economy is so 
highly dependent on external markets that the movements of the underdeveloped group's 
labor supply are almost entirely determined by exogenous forces. Typically there is high mi-
gration and mobility of workers belonging to the peripheral group in response to price fluc-
tuations of exported goods (Hechter 1999, p. 33). 
The case of South Texas in the late nineteenth century illustrates this. "There was 
no question among Anglo settlers in South Texas that a major asset of the region consisted 
of its cheap labor pool" (Montejano 1999, p. 198). As the Anglo large-scale farmer came to 
devote more and more resources to the cultivation of commodities for export, the issue of 
available cheap labor at the right time became more pressing. The Anglo farmer seized 
upon limiting the rights of their Mexican work force to create a competitive advantage in the 
market. Consequently, the Anglo farmers sought to minimize costs through wage fixing. "In 
order to eliminate the possibility of competitive bidding for labor, local farm organizations 
would meet before the season opened to determine the prevailing rates that all growers of a 
particular crop or in a certain locality were expected to follow" (Montejano 1999, p. 198}. In 
addition steps were taken to restrict the mobility of the Mexican agricultural worker in order 
to preserve the effectiveness of the local wage-fixing effort. Immobilization methods ranged 
from financial (i.e. debt} to legal (i.e. the threat of the Border Patrol). 
There were significant disagreements among the Anglo settlers regarding the direc-
tion for economic development. The large-scale farmers and their supporters held that con-
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tinued economic growth was directly tied to the availability of Mexican labor and therefore 
advocated for an open border policy with Mexico. In contrast, small farmers and urban la-
borers held that Anglo labor alone could continue the development of the area and therefore 
argued for aclosed-border policy and the immediate repatriation of Mexicans in the commu-
pity (Montejano 1999, p. 182). 
The cultural distinctiveness used to justify the dual labor market also justified partici-
pation in the community's decision-making processes. The tactics used to discourage par-
ticipation vary. Discriminatory institutional procedures have characteristically been the most 
successful and least damaging to legitimacy. Rules emerge that reflect the institutional 
goals. and that protect and promote the center's social and economic interest. These rules 
produce institutional power that not only controls the "participants within the decision-making 
process", but also excludes certain individuals altogether (Gaventa 1980, p. 9). The pre-
vailing rules help the center determine the policy agenda. institutional rules reinforce the 
political and economic resources that continue to systematically benefit the center at the ex-
pense of the underdeveloped periphery (Duncan 1999, p. 12). 
The situation in the Lower Rio Grande Valley in the early twentieth century was such 
that the Anglo farm settler treated the Mexican-American as racial inferiors and therefore 
unfit to vote. "The newcomers generally described their campaigns as uplift movements 
meant to purify the ballot, develop the country, and make Americanism supreme" (Monte- 
jano 1999, p.131). These sentiments paved the way for a variety of measures designed to 
make it difficult for the Mexican-American to vote. Measures included poll taxes and the 
elimination of an interpreter at the voting polls for naturalized citizens who had been US citi-
zens for less than twenty-one years. 
These institutional procedures served to remove the underdeveloped peripheral 
group from the decision-making process (Duncan 1999, p. 12). Increasingly powerlessness 
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led to resignation. "Just as the dominant may become so secure with their position as to be-
come oblivious, so too many such things as routines, internalization of roles or false con-
sensus lead to acceptance of the status quo by the dominated" (Gaventa 1980, p. 11). Thus 
the center further consolidates its social and economic interest. It essentially coaches the 
underdeveloped periphery to blame itself for its poor condition. The message slowly be- 
comes aself-fulfilling prophecy for the peripheral group, further legitimizing the center-
controled decision-making process, which they believe to be in their best interest (Hechter 
1975, p. 160) . 
Faced with a social identity based on a foundation of cultural inferiority coaching, the 
underdeveloped peripheral group views community participation with a resigned `why 
bother' attitude. Although nonparticipation of the peripheral poor reveals a function of power 
"such that power serves for the development and maintenance of the quiescence" of the pe-
ripheral poor, the center declares otherwise (Gaventa 1980, p. 7). Interpreting nonparticipa-
tion as a deficiency on the part of the peripheral poor, the center treats the behavior 
"through remedial education or cultural integration" (Gaventa 1980, p. 8). Changing the pe-
ripheral poor becomes the institutional strategy, rather than addressing the decision-making 
processes. 
Legacy 
Internal colonialism's initial inception is the cultural distinctiveness that exists be-
tween the center and peripheral groups. Culture is that lens through which community 
members are socialized to comprehend and define their social and nonsocial world (Hechter 
1975, p. 34}. Weber termed collectivities with distinctive cultures status groups. In terms of 
internal colonialism, each status group fills a position on a hierarchy of prestige in accord 
with their degree of access to the resources, determined by cultural identification (Weber 
1947). Weber demonstrates culture's importance as the basis of social solidarity in devel-
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oping societies. He insists the basis of social solidarity is not static but is continuously 
evolving. In this context, from the moment in which distinct cultural groups come into sus-
tained contact, the emerging structural conditions dictate inter-group accommodations 
ranging from acculturation to isolation, with assimilation occupying the gray space in be-
tween. 
Ideally, reciprocity and tolerance would occur between groups, facilitating full cultural 
integration and leading to a process through which cultural differences between groups in 
contact would gradually become indistinct. This scenario resembles what has been termed 
acculturation, the process through which a new culture emerges from elements of the inter-
acting cultural groups. Cultural distinction is exploited in the internal colonial situation to 
justify the maintenance of an unequal distribution of economic and political capital between 
the center and peripheral groups (Hechter 1975), significantly reducing the likelihood that 
cultural integration or acculturation will occur. 
The internal colonial situation promotes assimilation and/or eventual isolation. The 
assimilation process legitimizes the center's authority in two forms. First the members be-
longing to the peripheral group's leadership (i.e. the economically privileged which will be 
termed the developed peripheral group) participate in the primary assimilation prooess. The 
developed peripheral group secures increased economic and political opportunities through 
alliances with the center. The primary assimilation process permits an invisible hand ap-
proach; the center group governs through the developed peripheral group. 
The secondary assimilation process involves members belonging to what is termed 
the underdeveloped peripheral group (i.e. the working class and the poor). For the under-
developed peripheral group, the secondary assimilation process provides access to the 
center group's institutions for low paying employment opportunities and welfare. The un-
derdeveloped peripheral group is "stripped of culture and values losing their identity" within 
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their community, yet they remain marginalized (Johnson 1972, p. 283). Consequently 
members of the underdeveloped peripheral group are not permitted to participate in primary 
power roles, significantly limiting access to economic, political and social resources. 
The dual assimilation process that unfolds in the internal colonial situation typically 
creates animosity between the developed and underdeveloped peripheral groups (Hechter 
1975, p. 109). Animosity and increasing frustration lead the underdeveloped peripheral 
group to resign themselves to secondary roles in society, as they become increasingly iso-
lated. Both the dual assimilation and isolation processes serve the center group's interests 
and place the peripheral groups at a greater disadvantage. The mounting disadvantages 
are attributed to cultural inadequacies versus structural conditions, creating the impression 
of backwardness. Cultural inferiority, promoted by the center, evolves into aself-fulfilling 
prophecy for the disadvantaged underdeveloped periphery group. 
The bonds of social solidarity, according to Weber, evolve with the development 
process, shifting from culture to social class. Basically the underdeveloped community, as a 
status group, is granted low social, political and economic prestige based on cultural dis-
tinctiveness. As the development process unfolds, cultural solidarity gradually evolves to-
ward divisions based on social class. In place of social solidarity we therefore have an 
emerging solidarity termed class solidarity. Class solidarity is orientated towards the mar-
ketplace and generally organized in occupational groups. 
The internal colonial situation follows an identical process. It gradually shifts from 
cultural division towards social class division. The legacy of the internal colonial situation is 
a community in which social, political and economic cleavages flow along class solidarity 
lines. Accordingly, the higher-class determines the allocation of community resources. 
"Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested 
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interest" (Gaventa 1980, p. 14), while other periphery members are excluded from full par-
ticipation on the basis of class distinction (Duncan 1999, p. 13). 
For the center and the developed peripheral group, initial good fortune turns into a 
competitive advantage worth reproducing. The center-peripheral relationship's historical 
processes set the stage for the progressively unequal distribution of economic resources. 
"Decisions about investment, credit, and wages" are made entirely by the center group and 
implemented by the developed peripheral group (Hechter 1975, p. 10). As a consequence, 
economic dependence grows, and the wealth for the underdeveloped peripheral group lags 
far behind the center and developed peripheral group. An unequal distribution of economic 
and political resources between the developed and underdeveloped peripheral groups be-
comes the legacy as well as the repetitive cycle of non-development. 
To secure the privilege of present and future generations, the developed group cre-
ates public policy and fosters those institutions most likely to safeguard their competitive ad-
vantaged monopoly. The unfolding social system regulates "the allocation of social roles 
such that those roles commonly defined as having high prestige are reserved for its mem-
bers" reproducing the division of labor more and more based on social class (Hechter 1975, 
p. 9}. The members of the developed and underdeveloped peripheral groups become iden-
tifiable through the range of economic and power roles available to them. 
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Figure 1.2 
Legacy of Internal Colonialism is Marginalization 
Legacy of IrYternal Cdor~ialism 
The Core evoves into loss associations tem~ed the Developed Group possessing an eoorbrric grid pditical 
competitive advantage v~a'th reprodudng. In contrast the Peripheral evolves into lass assodations tem~ed 
The Urxjerdeveloped Group pos.~essing very limited ecor~orric and pditical resources. 
Internal Colonialism and Cultural Capital 
The internal colonialism concept sheds some light on the origins of political divisions 
that influence decision-making and citizen participation in the developing society. It is im-
portant to understand the local historical processes, given that the lack of citizen participa-
tion or apathy reflects the legacies of history. These are legacies passed down from gen-
eration to generation, culturally imprinting the understanding of society and each citizen's 
role in that society, cultural capital. 
Cultural capital determines what constitutes `knowledge,' how knowledge is to 
be achieved, and how knowledge is validated. Those with power are able to 
define these key issues according to their own values, and provide their chil-
dren with cultural advantages that are translated into social and economic 
advantage (Flora 2003, p. 3). 
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The transforming conditions associated with development driven by exogenous 
forces on a developing society radically change the social basis upon which the socialization 
process that establishes values is based. The cultural capital of the dominant center group 
severely undermines, if not completely removes, the underdeveloped peripheral group's 
cultural capital. Influenced by the development processes associated to the internal colonial 
situation, the center's cultural capital determines which citizens will participate and commu-
nicates this message to the society and its members. The underlying political associations 
and the social alliances become the legacy of the internal colonial situation and turn into the 
aforementioned competitive advantage protected and promoted through the embedded cul- 
to ral capital. 
Within operating political associations there is always the potential for political inte-
gration of the underdeveloped peripheral group, or the redefining of cultural capital. How-
ever, political integration entirely depends on the defined social and political situation. For 
the developed peripheral group, considerations are driven by the potential for unfavorable 
change to their situation, as well as the social disruptiveness of rising expectations on behalf 
of the underdeveloped peripheral group. 
Integration may be a completely unreasonable option for the underdeveloped pe-
ripheral group. Motivated by complete resignation, their disadvantaged position, or distrust, 
the underdeveloped group may refuse to participate. Although nonparticipation may be 
viewed as an irrational reaction, it suits the cultural capital established by the power-wielding 
center group. 
Given that group identification is based on role accessibility, it becomes more and 
more likely that the underdeveloped peripheral group will gradually become isolated. In 
terms of social change the push towards isolation is associated with social disorganization. 
It reinforces the cultural capital that inhibits participation and severely weakens the potential 
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for future involvement in the development process and thus its outcomes. The obstacle to 
development therefore is not the underdeveloped peripheral group's integration, rather the 
non-integration promoted by economic and political interests of the internal colonialism 
situation's historical processes and the ensuing legacy. The internal colonialism situation 
creates a cultural capital. That cultural capital in turn creates social disorganization or lack 
of social capital for the underdeveloped peripheral group. The cultural capital and social 
capital embedded in the community mutually reinforce the lack of participation in develop-
ment policy implementation. This offers a glimpse into the dynamics of what Oscar Lewis 
termed a ̀ culture of poverty' in a developing society. 
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Chapter 2. Social Disorganization 
Internal colonialism, although very useful in explaining the lack of citizen participation 
from a cultural capital perspective, remains an incomplete explanation. While is shows how 
the lack of participation with respect to economic, cultural, and political institutions develops, 
particularly in areas of persistent poverty, it fails to address the social organization neces-
sary to solve the lack of citizen participation. How can we socially reorganize communities 
in order to motivate for citizen participation? 
Scholars and politicians have consistently neglected that crucial aspect of the devel-
opment process, citizen participation, "that could lead to the empowerment and involvement 
of poor individuals in struggles and strategies to change their status" (Cohen and Dawson 
1993, p. 286). This aspect of the development process is slowly changing, but increasing 
citizen participation remains elusive. This raises the question, how do some persistently 
poor rural communities gain resident and community cooperation for community based anti-
poverty programs? 
Historical processes and the subsequent legacy of economic and political interests 
are terribly important but not sufficient on their own to help understand how citizen participa-
tion is achieved. They do help to understand how structural conditions are formed and how 
processes in a particular community operate. Yet this does not completely explain just how 
to advocate reorganization for citizen participation. We therefore are not convinced that the 
internal colonialism legacy concept alone adequately explains the inability of persistently 
poor communities to mobilize. This dilemma led me to seek a second theoretical concept. 
The concept of social disorganization sheds light on the organizational dynamics with which 
policy implementation will have to deal in distressed communities. It is these dynamics that 
influence the level of citizen participation and citizens' access to information, information that 
could potentially bring about reorganization and change. 
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In this chapter I introduce the socia! disorganization concept. I then describe the ba-
sic social disorganization model's origin and note the shortcomings. I then discuss how the 
traditional model has evolved and been reformulated as a systemic model. Finally, I discuss 
social disorganization in relation to social capital. 
Social Disorganization 
Social disorganization refers to a state of social disorder. Social order rises from a 
high degree of social ties among and between community members and institutions. The 
resulting interaction facilitates agreement regarding common goals to pursue and how 
community members need to behave and how not to behave in order to achieve those 
goals. Social disorganization conceptually links social disorder to pronounced social 
change, itself a product of uneven historical development that influences the character of the 
community, as well as the behavior of community members. Social disorganization theory 
holds that a community is organized when its members "have developed agreement about 
fundamental values and norms, with behavioral regularity". 
The concept's underlying assumption is that the presence of social structural condi-
tions dictates the abundance and type of intra-community and inter-community ties, formal 
and informal, which facilitate the ability to address common problems, such as social order. 
use social disorganization to refer to the inability of a community to leverage potential so-
cial networks to access or exchange information necessary to foster citizen participation, 
which leads towards shared implementation of common goals. The social disorganization 
concept focuses attention on lack of social networks and the dynamics of access or ex-
change of information among and between community residents. This creates a perspec-
tive of local community in terms of the information and communication associated to these 
formal and informal social groups and networks. Social disorganization limits the realization 
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of a shared vision and community mobilization, necessary to achieve a more egalitarian 
community-based development. 
The Concept's Origins 
The World Wars and the Great Depression produced pronounced social changes in 
the nation's social and economic landscape. The ensuing migration, urbanization and in-
dustrialization severely weakened existing social bonds and social controls in the community 
that led to social disorder. Thus a framework to explain and understand the unfolding phe-
nomena was needed. The concept of social disorganization is associated with the Chicago 
school of human ecology, based on the work of Clifford Shaw (1931) and Henry McKay 
(1931). The concept grounded its explanation of social disorder in social norms and com-
munity activities and treated culture in relative terms. Social patterns (cultural capital} over 
time produced social disorganization that in turn led to crime and deviance. 
The social disorganization theoretical framework evolved from other proponents of 
the Chicago school, Park and Burgess and their Concentric Zone Model (Bursik and Gras- 
mick 1995, p. 108). They introduced an ecological analysis of crime causation that put forth 
the view that residential instability found in poor communities weakened social control (Vey-
sey and Messner 1999, p. 160). Their concept of residential instability embodied two key 
factors. The first dimension of residential instability refers to rate of residential turnover, and 
the second pertains to the community's heterogeneity (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, p. 109). 
"These factors affect" the community "through the processes of value and norm conflicts, 
cultural change and cultural vacuums, and the weakening" of informal and formal networks 
(Veysey and Messner 1999, p. 160). 
Their model sought to explain the relationship between human ecology and social 
disorganization (Veysey and Messner 1999, p. 159}. As such their model employed Dar-
winian imagery of adaptation and survival (i.e. plants and animals) for explanatory means. 
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"As with the succession of plant species" communities progress "through the stages of inva-
sion, conflict, accommodation and assimilation", very much resembling what we have previ-
ously defined internal colonialism (Veysey and Messner 1999, p. 159). 
The process begins with the community's original land use altered by invading ex-
ogenous interests, which in turn creates friction within the boundaries of the community. 
Park and Burgess defined social disorganization as the endogenous community's inability to 
take the necessary collective action to repel the exogenous interest. The emerging animos-
ity between the new and old land users erupts into conflict leading to the displacement of the 
original land users, due to perceived limited endogenous resources. The displaced original 
land users settle "another area and the emergence of a new stable phase" begins (Veysey 
and Messner 1999, p. 159). 
Burgess (1925) in "Growth of a City" provides an example of the concentric zone 
model. Driven by exogenous economic interest, business entrepreneurs began the practice 
of land speculation. The business entrepreneur generally is not part of the area's original 
community. The business entrepreneur purchases an expanse of land anticipating future 
exogenous driven economic development. Seeking to minimize the costs of investment the 
business entrepreneur "invest(s) as little money as possible in the maintenance and upkeep 
of the property in the area" (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, p. 109). Over time the area's infra-
structure falls into decay. The area becomes an inexpensive residential option for the poor, 
increasing the concentration of poverty. The original land users begin to migrate from the 
area "giving rise to the observed relationship between socioeconomic composition" of a 
community and its distance from the areas of economic development (Bursik and Grasmick 
1995, p. 109). The emergent social patterns and lack of community attachment orchestrate 
social disorder. 
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Shaw and McKay used the underlying principles of the Park and Burgess's Concen-
tric Zone Model in the development of the theoretical framework of Social Disorganization, 
which they employed in the study of higher crime Chicago neighborhoods. Over the course 
of a 30-year period, they found that these Chicago neighborhoods had undergone dramatic 
demographic shifts, especially in the areas' ethnic composition. They concluded that the 
high incidence of criminal behavior in these communities stems from what they termed so-
cial disorganization (Warner and Rountree 1997, p. 520). 
The theoretical framework, following Park and Burgess's (1920} example, proposed 
two consequences resulting from residential turnover. They first established that residential 
turnover led to community instability4 (Sampson 1988, p. 767). Highly mobile residents, they 
assumed, are unable to locate themselves in the community's formal and informal social 
networks (Sampson 1988, p. 768). Secondly, they assumed, the racial and ethnic heteroge-
neity influenced community attachment or lack there of (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, p. 109). 
Heterogeneity therefore diminished the type and density of social ties, especially informal 
social networks (Warner 1999, p. 101). The effectiveness of informal social networks is re-
duced by high residential community instability and heterogeneity (Bursik and Grasmick 
1993, p. 35) . 
The general hypothesis suggests that three exogenous structural conditions (low 
economic status, racial/ethnic heterogeneity, and high residential turnover) diminish social 
organization, decreasing the likelihood of collective action. These factors effect the commu-
nity's organizational capacity "through the processes of value and norm conflicts...and the 
weakening" of formal and informal social networks (Veysey and Messner1999, 160). The 
a Community instability is used to describe weakened locality-based social networks such as the de-
velopment of extensive friendship and kinship bonds and local associationai ties. 
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regulatory capacity of the community necessary to take common action to solve a locally 
recognized problem is diminished. 
In 1932 Clifford Shaw and Henry Mckay used the same underlying principles of the 
social disorganization (S.D.) model to design and implement the Chicago Area Project (Bur- 
sik and Grasmick 1993, p. 160-166). The mission of the project was to establish neighbor-
hood-based crime prevention. In fact the project was directed toward the "mobilization of 
local community leaders, the development of working arrangements between residents and 
the criminal justice system and the utilization of former gang members" (Bursik and Gras-
mirk 1995, p. 107). Their goal was to organize the community through citizen participation. 
The Shaw and Mckay theoretical framework was severely criticized for its highly re-
stricted view of community. Criticisms were specifically directed to their failure to adequately 
consider historical processes and exogenous political and structural factors influencing the 
community. Contemporary models have attempted to reformulate the traditional model and 
address the criticisms as a systemic model (Sampson and Wilson 1995, p. 48). 
Social Disorganization's Contemporary Framework 
In the late 1970s the social disorganization model reappeared in academic circles 
under the heading `Systemic Model of Community Attachment'. It was an attempt to ad-
dress the criticism associated with the theory's initial treatment of the concept of community. 
The systemic model's framework defined a community as a "complex system of friendship 
and kinship networks and formal and informal ties rooted in family life and on-going sociali-
zation processes" (Kasarda and Janowitz, 1974, p. 329). The systemic model's underlying 
assumptions retained focus on the role that social ties and control play in a community's so-
vial order (Warner 1999, p. 99). 
The model framed residential stability and racial/ethnic heterogeneity as its primary 
structural variables affecting the community's shared norms regarding appropriate commu-
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nity behavior and attitudes (Kornhauser 1978). Additional variables were introduced as the 
model evolved, such as age, the number of friends. Unlike the traditional model, the role of 
poverty was less clearly developed in the contemporary model's framework (Warner and 
Roundtree 1997, p. 521). Poverty became "a proxy for other variables more consistent with 
the systemic model" (Warner 1999, p. 105). 
In 1974 Kasarda and Janowitz, presented a systemic model in which they assumed 
that the abundance and type of social networks mitigated the influence of community social 
structural conditions. Their model proposed that high residential turnover and racial/ethnic 
heterogeneity hampered the development of social networks, diminishing the regulatory ca-
pabilities and social control thereby weakening the community's social order. The general 
hypothesis that emerged from this model suggested that the exogenous factors (high resi-
dential stability and racial/ethnic homogeneity) increased social order. 
Sampson (1987) presented a framework that focused more on the role of informal 
social ties and control. Specifically, he linked poverty with family disruption. A conceptuali-
zation supported by poverty literature suggests that "much of the growth in poverty has been 
among single-parent families" (Warner 1999, p. 105). By linking poverty and single parent 
families Sampson (1987) considered family disruption to be the principal structural variable 
in his systemic model. He assumed that family disruption (i.e. disruption to informal social 
ties and controls) effects the structural conditions, in turn affecting the community's social 
order. He hypothesized that the three exogenous factors (family disruption, high residential 
turnover and racial/ethnic heterogeneity) hamper the formation of informal social ties, 
thereby diminishing the regulatory capabilities and social control. 
Later efforts have been made to counter the poverty variable's underdeveloped role 
through defining measures of economic disadvantage (Warner 1999, p. 100). Both the ef-
fects of low income and socioeconomic status have been compared with regard to their re-
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lation to a community's level of social order. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) found economic 
deprivation carried a positive direct effect on a community's social order. Other researchers' 
findings supported the relationship between poverty and social order (Warner and Rountree 
1997). Similarly researchers have found decreased social control in communities charac-
terized as homogeneous and relatively stable in terms of residential turnover. These find-
ings have contradicted the model's framework, which proposed residential stability and ho-
mogeneity create the social circumstances for residents to "come together to establish and 
enforce norms more easily and in fact, should decrease the effect of poverty" on social order 
(Warner and Pierce 1993, p. 511). 
That evidence led to the concept of concentrated poverty or the role of oppositional 
culture (Warner and Rountree 1997, p. 523). Wilson (1987) describes the concentration ef-
fect. The working and middle class tend to migrate from economically poor communities as 
they become upwardly mobile. The class-based exodus removes valuable inter-community 
and intra-community social networks, increasing the likelihood for social isolation. Over 
time, such a scenario perpetuates a highly homogeneous poor community with little access 
to formal social networks. 
Consequently, more recent attempts have linked poverty to extra-community ties. 
Warner (1999) insists "it has remained unclear why residents of communities with a higher 
percentage of poor persons would have fewer social ties among neighbors, aside from is-
sues of mobility and heterogeneity" (p. 101 }. The state of poverty connotes a lack of re-
sources that is equivalent to material deprivation, requiring the poor to share resources and 
thus rely on informal social ties (i.e. neighbors and family). Similarly Sennett (1970) sug-
gests "...sharing between individuals and families is a necessary element of survival" within 
persistently poor communities (p. 47). The resources shared range from loans to items 
such as appliances (i.e. a vacuum cleaner) or groceries. Following Warner (1999) and Sen-
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nett's (1970) examples, these models assume that informal social ties within poor communi-
ties are not lacking. To the contrary what is lacking is access to extra-community networks. 
Merry (1981) highlights the role of racial and ethnic heterogeneity. She describes 
the link between a highly heterogeneous community and a closed system of informal social 
networks. The principle assumption is that high racial and ethnic heterogeneity creates is-
lands of informal social groups. In turn these groups lack social linkages to other informal 
social groups, limiting the community's overall social control. 
These more recent frameworks of the systemic model stress that insufficient social 
ties between poor communities and governmental and non-governmental agencies affects 
the community's social order. The role of extra-community social networks challenges the 
assumption of the exclusive role of community-based social networks with respect to social 
control (Warner and Rountree 1997, p. 523). Poor communities often lack the capacity to 
advocate in support of or against extra-community institutional involvement in their affairs. 
Kornhauser (1978) assumes that extra-community formal social ties are lacking in 
poor communities. He suggests that poverty reduces the economic and social resources 
available to community institutions, such as schools or neighborhood organizations (p. 73). 
As a result institutional social control is weakened. Kornhauser (1978) states that residential 
instability increases institutional instability (p. 78-81). 
Bursik and Grasmick (1995) propose that informal social control is not exclusively 
dependent upon community-based social ties, but also on the community's ability to mobi-
lize more formal social ties with extra-community social networks. Agencies external to the 
community decide public programs and policies. Thus a community with limited vertical 
formal social ties is far less likely to defend and promote its interests, preserving the state of 
disorganization or the impoverished condition. 
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Warner and Rountree (1997} state if "poor or minority neighborhoods are not able to 
successfully engage police in community attempts to control crime, the ability of local ties to 
informally control crime may be significantly weakened" (p. 523). This limits the commu-
nity's ability to develop mutually serving relationships with institutions and thereby influences 
residential satisfaction with the policies and services rendered (Warner and Rountree 1997, 
p. 523). Dissatisfaction with the policies and services undermines community-based social 
ties and control. Institutional programs and policies, consequently, may be implemented 
which negatively influence the community's ability to organize and regulate behavior, re-
sulting in overall decreased organization. 
The evolving contemporary social disorganization model highlights the influence of 
structural conditions on the degree of closure experienced by social networks. Wacquant 
and Wilson {1989) explain that persistently poor communities lack the opportunity to create 
open relationships. Bursik and Grasmick (1995) add that, "the social boundaries that may 
exist between groups...can decrease the breadth of supervisory activities because of the 
mutual distrust among groups in such areas" (p. 115). The concept of closure, equivalent to 
what Weber (1947) termed a `closed system', refers to bringing a primary group closer to-
gether at the exclusion of non-members. It is the closure or the degree of openness of the 
relational networks that in turn shape the dissemination of information among and between 
community members, regarding the common expectations. 
The contemporary social disorganization model's evolution has led to a greater focus 
on how the regulatory capacities and social control embedded in social networks, among 
and between communities, either create or reinforce social order or the lack there of. 
Social Disorganization and Social Capital 
That macro-social patterns of residential inequality produce both social isolation and 
concentrated areas of the poor people is the basis of the theory of social disorganization. 
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Isolation and concentration lead to structural barriers and cultural adaptations that under-
mine the construction of common vision and action (Sampson and Wilson 1995, p. 38). It 
assumes concentrated poverty negatively influences community mobilization and action, 
because it greatly limits the availability and opportunity to develop the social ties necessary 
to organize and lobby for inter-community and intra-community institutional support (Warner 
1999, p. 106). The emerging disorganization greatly reduces the community's capacity to 
mobilize the necessary social, political and economic resources due to limited access to, 
and exchange of information. The instrumentality of social, political and economic re-
sources is lost or obscured, reducing the community and policy makers' ability to address 
common issues. 
The social disorganization concept encourages locality-based initiatives to seek and 
foster existing community social networks (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, p. 111). Initiative 
goals, following the example of the Chicago Area Project, should be organized and directed 
by local community residents fostering community involvement in the everyday activities to 
increase a sense of community ownership. Community involvement teaches citizens 
through participation the importance and need to foment social ties. It is thus beneficial to 
create and use "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that 
can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action" (Putman 1993, p. 
167) . 
The concept of social disorganization sounds practical enough. How can we make 
the concept concrete for policy design, implementation and measurement? Special consid-
eration must be given to the structure of relationships among and between local community 
members that may facilitate the ability to take the collective action needed to address a 
community-recognized problem. "Social solidarity" refers to "the degree to which the need 
for individual success is less important than the need for the social recognition and approval 
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of one's neighbors" (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, p. 111). Social recognition is granted via 
reciprocal social networks that join community members to each other. A community is con-
sidered organized when solidarity is strong. In more contemporary terms, the concept of 
social solidarity is identical to social capital. 
Unfortunately, the concept of social capital has been expanded repeatedly to explain 
many social maladies. The point is fast approaching when the concept of social capital be-
comes so diluted that it is no longer a useful explanatory means. Many scholars including 
Portes (1998), Narayan (1999) and Flora (1999) share this sentiment. Consequently it is 
necessary to reiterate a definition reflecting the core components of the concept's origins. 
The idea of having social organization leading to social capital is an operational definition. 
At least one more rigidly applied to the process of citizen participation. 
Bourdieu's definition of social capital focuses on its instrumentality (fortes 1998, p. 
3). "Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual ac-
quaintance and recognition" which are in turn used to accrue profits (Bourdieu 1986, p. p. 
248). These benefits accruing to members of the given group or community are the direct 
basis of the solidarity, the purpose of which is the creation of the previously mentioned ac-
tual or potential resources (fortes 1998, p. 3). This gives rise to a solidarity based in clear 
profit or instrumentality. 
Coleman's (1988) theoretical orientation regarding social capital includes compo-
nents of both rational choice and functionalism (Flora 1999, p. 3). He defined social capital 
by its function. "It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in 
common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain ac-
tions of actors within the structure" (Coleman 1988, p. S98). The existence of social capital, 
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as is the case with financial and human capital, makes the achievement of certain goals 
possible (Coleman 1988, p. S98). 
From these two definitions I extract two integral points. First, both Bourdieu (1988) 
and Coleman (1988) explicitly imply that, unlike financial or human capital, social capital is a 
resource embedded in the social relationships between and among social actors. It is not 
inherent in an individual. Secondly, social capital facilitates or hinders action. Combining 
these two components with Putman's (1993) definition of social capital, "features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society 
by facilitating coordinated action" (Putman 1993, p. 167), I define social capital as the inten-
tional social relations and their sanctions necessary to foster accountability, embedded in 
the social structure of any given community. 
This definition of social capital helps answer the question of how to make the social 
disorganization concept more useable. Firstly, social capital is not inherent in an individual, 
and, unlike financial and human capital, social capital is a public good. "The kinds of social 
structures that make possible social norms and the sanctions that enforce them do not 
benefit primarily the person or persons whose efforts would be necessary to bring them 
about, but benefit all those who are part of a such a structure" (Coleman 1988, p. S 117). 
Secondly, unlike financial and human capital, social capital accumulates with use. 
When residents of a community have experienced cooperation for some duration, shared 
norms and patterns of reciprocity develop. For example "trust lubricates cooperation...the 
greater the levels of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation...and 
cooperation itself breeds trust" (Putman 1993, p. 171). Conversely, those communities 
lacking social capital fail to cooperate and, thus, what social capital they might possess con-
tinues to diminish. Putman (1993) explains that "defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, 
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isolation, disorder, and stagnation intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious 
circles" (p. 177). 
The social disorganization model's framework stresses aspects of regulatory capac-
ity and communal cooperation in what is termed social organization. The underlying deter-
minant of social organization is therefore social capital. Social capital reduces the transac-
tion cost that cooperation demands between social actors for social and/or fiscal initiatives. 
Utilizing "pre-existing social connections between individuals to help circumvent problems of 
imperfect information and enforceability" facilitates organization (Putman 1993, p. 169). Yet 
the presence of social capital is not sufficient to create the organization necessary to foster 
citizen participation. To the contrary, two types of social capital must be present in the right 
balance, bonding and bridging. Too much of one offsets the balance and creates isolation 
or lack of ownership. 
Bursik and Grasmick's categorization of social networks help clarify this point (p. 
114). Through the private and parochial level of control, the community's access to informa-
tion and regulatory capacity is developed and implemented. First the private level of control 
refers to those social networks characterized as intimate and informal. The community's 
defined expectations are communicated and informally enforced by these locally based pri-
vate networks. Consider education. If education is a highly defined community expectation, 
then friendship groups, neighborhood groups and familial groups will promote and reward 
fulfillment of this common vision. 
Second there is what is termed the parochial level of control that represents a less 
interpersonal and extensive network. Communication is carried out in a more formal setting 
with a far less degree of intimacy than that found in private networks. Nonetheless the 
transmission of information remains the key point. Consider the relational networks found in 
community organizations or institutions. As resident participants in a community organiza-
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tion, they may become concerned with economic development as a result of increased ac-
cess to information. 
Following the categorization of private and parochial networks that exist in a commu-
nity, there exist two types of social capital that are not mutually exclusive. The first, `bonding 
social capital', operating "at the micro-levels, the strong ties connecting family members, 
neighbors, and close friends" (Narayan 1999, 4.3) follows the conceptualization of the pri-
vate level of control. For example, neighbors interacting with other neighbors in the spatially 
distinct place of the neighborhood. These interactions may include such acts as "borrowing 
small items, visiting, discussing local problems, and helping each other with small tasks; 
work and socialize in the neighborhood; and use of neighborhood facilities for worship and 
grocery shopping" (Gittel et al. 1998, 17). These interactions, however only involve those 
neighbors in the neighborhood, but not nearby neighborhood residents. 
The second type follows the parochial level of control example and is termed bridg-
ing social capital. It is defined as "the weak ties connecting "rndividuafs to work colleagues, 
fellow members of religious or civic organizations, and business associates" (Narayan 1999, 
4.4). Bridging social capital implies flexible horizontal connections linking people in numer-
ous positions of formal and informal organization. This definition is similar to that proposed 
by Granovetter's (1973) of the strength of weak ties. For Granovetter, (1973) the dispersed 
social relations characterizing bridging capital are particularly useful. "Whatever is being 
diffused can reach a larger number of people and traverse greater social distance when 
passed through weak ties rather than strong...weak ties are an important resource in mak-
ing possible mobility of opportunity" (Granovetter 1973, p. 1371). 
Bridging social capital facilitates and bonding social capital hinders collective 
action at the community level. Bridging capital is a fundamental and necessary element to 
community development efforts. It provides the basis through which targeted communities, 
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characterized as lacking resources and opportunities, may link with outside resources and 
opportunities. in the case of the social disorganization concept, bonding social capital may 
be much more important than the bridging social capital. 
Closure is of particular importance in the development of our conceptual framework. 
It refers to the degree to which social networks exchange information across social bounda-
ries. Granovetter (1973) comments that when participants of a given social group are con-
nected to every member of that group, yet disconnected to an outside social group, the ex-
change of information is limited and regulatory capacities develop in isolation (p. 1373). 
Closure decreases access and exchange of information of a community and makes it diffi-
cult to define a common vision and mobilize the collective action necessary to ensure the 
social change needed to address the community issue. 
Closure of a social network is fundamentally equivalent to what Wilson (1987) has 
termed social isolation. He argues that communities in which residents become discon-
nected from networks that facilitate economic and social participation become isolated. 
Cohen and Dawson (1993} examined the impact of severe community poverty on social 
network structure in both political and economic terms. They found that residents living in 
communities characterized as areas of high poverty concentration are less likely to partici-
pate in political and economic opportunities, due to social network structural constraints. 
These constraints therefore motivate residents and community-based groups to disengage 
from the larger community, drifting into social isolation away from participation. 
A community characterized as closed or isolated is considered disorganized (Cohen 
and Dawson 1993, p. 287). The lack of social ties with outside governmental and nongov-
ernmental groups reduces the ability to leverage public networks, to solicit resources and 
gain support that may be essential ingredients in order to increase the capacity of a com-
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munity and to address a common vision. Closure therefore reinforces the cycle of limited 
access and poor exchange of information, stifling citizen participation. 
In development processes we therefore strive for open social networks, delivering a 
balance between .both types of social capital, bridging access to both internal and external 
resources. Unquestionably, community-based internal social capital facilitates access and 
exchange of information. However as we mentioned in reference to `closure', an equal 
amount of bridging social capital is necessary. "A community can create these ties only if 
there are motivated local residents who already are aware of such sources of assistance 
and who are in a position to create such relationships" {Bursik and Grasmick 1995, p. 122). 
The important contribution of external actors has been recognized in the literature which 
discusses resource mobilization. Repeatedly the implementation and success of a devel-
opment program has depended on effective linkages between local movement organizers 
and externally based institutions (Bursik and Grasmick 1995). 
In the framework, social capital is employed to examine outreach activities and citi-
zen partnerships and community-based partnerships (i.e. access and exchange of informa-
tion) with respect to social organization. 
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Chapter 3. Internal Colonialism and Social Disorganization in the Rio Grande Valley 
This chapter does not intend to offer a complete history of the Lower Rio Grande 
Valley. Instead I have written a brief sketch that emphasizes those chapters in the story of 
this region that instigated social change through structural upheavals and institutional births. 
These historical moments reflected the difficulty of empowering communities. The following 
sketch offers an account of clashing regime changes with definitive consequences for class 
order and ethnic relations, which have shaped and continues to shape the distinctive ways 
of life of the Lower -Rio Grande Valley. This in turn influences the reception of development 
efforts today. 
From the Spanish-Mexican hacienda society onward, the Lower Rio Grande Valley 
has been forced to transform from a feudalistic type society into a modern commercial order. 
Landed elites and peasants were forced to respond to the push of uncontrollable market 
forces and the zealous foreign entrepreneurial merchant class. The driving force for dra-
matic social changes was not indigenously driven. Social change arrived in a charismatic 
and brutish manner, occasionally masked as development, but actually a form of economic 
conquest and colonization. 
The sequence of social changes can be described in three periods. 
1) Spanish-Mexican hacienda society; 
2) Anglo-Mexican ranch society; segregated farm society and 
3) Urban-industrial society (Montejano 1999). 
Spanish-Mexican Hacienda Society 
Born from shared communal lands, the Lower Rio Grande Valley began as a com-
munity with an idealistic common interest which quickly gave way to the class perils of the 
old world. From the 175os, the northernmost settlements of the Spanish-Mexican Empire 
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reached to the south banks of the Rio Grande River across from the present Lower Rio 
Grande Valley. 
The Spanish crown gave Colonel Jose de Escandon the task of establishing the 
northernmost settlements of what was then their colonial territory. He initiated a system to 
help the inhabitants cope with the inhospitable landscape and raiding natives. A system of 
shared land ensued that obliged the colonist to face prosperity, frustration and disappoint-
ment as a community. 
With time, social and economic divisions developed, and the initial communal ap-
proach fell by the wayside in the name of progress. The leading families and entrepreneurs 
of the newly emerging Lower Rio Grande towns became determined to carve out great es-
tates for themselves and their heirs and fought successfully to end the system of shared 
lands. In the case of the shared lands, the leading families and entrepreneurs suggested to 
the Spanish crown quite convincingly that the system provided a disincentive to make im-
provements and thus sabotaged production. They argued that privatization would unleash 
the prosperity of the region's economy. 
Spain ended the shared lands policy in 1767, leading to a gold rush-like influx as in-
habitants sought aggressively to secure precious land grants. Although the shared land 
system was dismantled, large tracts of land termed communal lands were reserved for 
Spanish authorities. The new land grants rapidly deteriorated the sense of community es-
tablished under the system of shared lands, and as the land was divided, so too were the 
Lower Rio Grande towns divided internally in a firm Spanish-Mexican class structure of 
wealthy estate owners and the poor. And so emerged the Spanish-Mexican hacienda soci-
ety, divided by land grants. 
From this time on, border towns were dominated by a ranching elite, which 
maintained a sharp class superiority over the poverty-ridden masses. In the 
1780s residents began to be listed by ethnic status either as (prestigious) 
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Spaniards or as (unprestigious} mestizos, mulattos, or Indians. Given the 
fact that one's listing in the caste system could be purchased, the reference 
was really to social/financial status rather than to racial identity (Kearney and 
Knapp 1995, p. 22). 
For the Spanish authorities, the shifting class structure had an unintended conse-
quence, in that many ranchers and merchants became part of an illegal economy that chal-
lenged the mercantilist system of the Spanish economic policy. Geographically, the U.S. 
was a natural trading partner, but Spanish policy stated in unambiguous terms that the sole 
trading partner of the Spanish Colony of Mexico was Spain. This exclusivity essentially 
suffocated all possible regional economic and population growth. As such the illegal trading 
relationships with the U.S. fostered development rather different than that envisioned by 
Spanish authorities. 
The initial influence of Anglo Americans in the Lower Rio Grande Valley arrived as 
an economic stimulant in the form of illegal trade. However, given the lucrative nature of 
illegal trade with the U.S., shortly after Mexican Independence in 1821 public policy was 
quickly ratified, officially embarking upon open trade with Americans (Teja 2002). Asa con-
sequence of the policy change, the influx of Anglo American merchants increased and so 
did their influence in the Lower Rio Grande towns. That alarmed many Mexican Authorities 
and quickly led to serious policy debate regarding Anglo colonization. 
Indeed Anglo American immigrants offered Mexico's under-populated northern ter-
ritory aready remedy. The immigrants initiated real estate speculation, and the population 
growth accelerated economic growth and increased the tax base. However, there remained 
a question of loyalty. "The argument was the danger that the Anglo settlers would prove 
loyal to an expansive United States rather than to their Mexican nationality. There is no 
question but that important elements in the United States were actively interested in the ac-
quisition of the region by their country" (Kearney and Knopp 1995, p. 44). The serious immi-
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gration policy dispute continued for years, swinging back and forth as power in Mexico 
changed hands. The Anglo-American influence continued to increase in the Lower Rio 
Grande towns, carrying unquestionable consequences for future social change. 
Ang/v-Mexican Ranch Society 
The fevered intensity and spirit of manifest destiny found embodiment in both Texas 
Independence of 1836 and the Mexican-American war waged a decade later. Both events 
placed the Lower Rio Grande Valley on the front line of war and provoked divided senti-
ments. However, unlike the Texas Revolution that involved Texas-Mexican participants, the 
war with Mexico was interpreted as a pure Anglo-American invasion. The predominantly 
Anglo-American merchants were delighted that the United States was finally asserting its 
claim towards the Rio Grande boundary. However, the Mexican population harbored both 
deep hostility and a defeated acceptance of the American invasion. Once more social 
change gained momentum and challenged the population of the region through accommo-
dations of the Anglo-American dominance in the region. 
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848} ou#lined the terms that defined the surren-
der of Mexico. Of specific interest to the Lower Rio Grande Valley inhabitants, the treaty 
defined the terms in which the Mexican towns of the south bank lost all their communal 
lands on the north bank of the Rio Grande River, as well as the rights of the Mexican Land 
grantees. The American towns of the Lower Rio Grande Valley were established in these 
former communal lands. The emergence of the new American towns swelled the Anglo-
American presence and influence. 
The Anglo presence overwhelmed the existing Mexican social and economic order. 
The incredible speed with which the societal upheaval occurred left the majority of the in-
habitants of the Lower Rio Grande Valley overwhelmed and resigned to the change. Con-
sequently the landed Mexican elite found themselves forced to took for strategies to protect 
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their position in society. The social restructuring that followed was formalized within a few 
years through the transformation of laws, public customs and authority. Social change was 
tempered by a need to govern.. The ability to govern the Texas-Mexican border region fell 
onto a peace structure designed to minimize the need for force to maintain order. Given 
that stability is absolutely paramount to any regional economy, a sharply defined class 
structure was used to create that framework. The defining characteristics of the peace 
structure were "the subordination of Mexicans to Anglos in matters of politics and authority; 
and the accommodation between new and old elites" (Montejano 1999, p. 34). 
Accommodation between the new and old elites was simply acculturation or a mutu-
ally beneficial adjustment. A great number of the newly arrived. Anglo-American elites were 
to a degree forced to acculturate because of numbers. Recognizing that influence and le-
gitimacy in the new society in which they found themselves could be harvested with greater 
ease by becoming familiar with language, custom and religious ceremony, the Anglo-
Americans graciously accepted. Many of the Anglo immigrants sought with great determi-
nation to participate in communal activities that furthered their understanding of local culture. 
One way to become family legitimately was to join the ranks of the Mexican ranching elites 
through marriage into influential Mexican families. 
The Mexican elites sought to secure political and economic alliances through family 
arrangements in order to save their estates and maintain their privilege in the quickly evoly-
ing society. Far those Mexican families whose fortunes did not qualify their daughters for 
marriage with an Anglo elite, the alternative for gaining social stature and/or protection was 
godparenthood: compadrazgo. 
The accommodation and acculturation between the new and old elites was beneficial 
for both, although by no means equal. Texas-Mexican male voters made up a sizable por-
tion of the electorate. For Anglo-American politicians wanting to recruit and organize new 
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voters, this meant partnership with an influential Mexican sponsor, typically an influential 
family. "Since these political machines delivered sizable blocs of votes in state and national 
elections," the Anglo politician acquired influence, as did the Mexican patron (Montejano 
1999, p. 40) . 
Economics, acculturation and accommodation between the new and old elite served 
the export-oriented economy, which favored the Anglo-American elite. The new elites were 
rapidly developing into an export-oriented group, with a regenerative wealth born from trade. 
In contrast, the old elite possessed a wealth tied to the land. Inherently, the difference be-
tween wealth types favored the new elite. "The play of the market became a primary in-
strumen# of displacement...This export-oriented elite, consisting of Anglo merchants and 
land lawyers, with Mexican merchants as minor partners, was the basic catalytic agent" 
transforming the economic and social fortunes (Montejano 1999, p. 41). The peace struc-
ture between the old and new elite did benefit and indeed save some of the Mexican upper 
class from social demise. 
Those landed Mexican elites that managed to benefit were unquestionably more 
savvy in commercialization, as well as more successful in seizing upon assimilation, which 
gave them a better opportunity to access to credit. Consequently they managed to retain 
some of their economic and social status, in the form of land and workers. Yet this group of 
landed Mexican elites was a small minority of the Mexican communities. For the majority of 
Texas Mexicans, they were not able to commercialize because of failed technological gam-
bles, unsuccessful attempts to access credit, or complacency. Complacency, however, 
played a very small role in the unfolding impoverished conditions that hammered the landed 
Mexican elite. They faced these conditions as a result of being money-poor (land wealth) 
that, in addition to ethnicity, led to limited access to credit and liens on land wealth. 
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The old settlements clung to their windmills rather than dig artesian wells, 
noted a resident, because of a lack of money. Mexican ranchers, according 
to another source, were receptive to technological innovation and improve-
ments, believing that as soon as technological equality was attained, social 
equality would follow. In attempts to keep pace with the new developments, 
some ranchers took the bold step of mortgaging their lands. In many cases, 
however, such a strategy only accelerated the loss of land and social status. 
Only a limited amount could be borrowed through a mortgage on land of little 
value. With liens on the land, as Mexican ranchers discovered, the capital 
source they could tap was exhausted. Again, the occasional droughts and 
dry-ups highlighted the precarious market situation of Mexican ranchers on 
unimproved land. With little money to improve water sources, droughts often 
proved to be the critical events that filtered out the poorly capitalized, ineffi-
cient ranches from the developing cattle industry (Montejano 1999, p. 59). 
In the end the culmination of an unfamiliar tax system, prolonged drought, disastrous fluc-
tuations of the cattle market, countless expenses related to defending land titles and lack of 
disposable financial capital to sink desperately needed wells led the old elite to join the 
ranks of those who had been economically left behind or displaced. The Mexican-Anglo 
ranch society, by no means egalitarian, fostered a very traditional patriarchic accommoda-
tion, where the patron was simply replaced by an Angio-American elite. 
Farm Society 
The Americanizing influences that had already impacted the region paled in com-
parison to the rail system that tied the Lower Rio Grande Valley to the rest of the United 
States, facilitating the transplant of entire Midwest farm communities. The new mode of 
transportation ferried hoards of new Anglo-American immigrants to the region, dramatically 
changing the demography and enabling the growing Anglo-American population to form 
their own exclusive society. Accommodation and acculturation declined, as did the inter-
marriages that had previously stabilized and saved elite Mexican-American status in the 
fragile class order. As the old Mexican elite's role diminished in the Lower Rio Grande Val-
ley, the peace structure began to erode, becoming an obsolete societal tool, much to the 
chagrin of the Mexican elite. The newly developing agricultural technology in tandem with 
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rail transportation began a great transformation in the local economy, in ethnic relations and 
in political exclusion. 
The ambitious dreams of farm colonization and economic development of the semi-
arid region began circulating with increasing vigor with every technological step forward (dry 
land farming techniques, irrigation systems and the refrigerated rail car). Historically 
speaking, the development equation was rather uncomplicated. The developers and ranch-
ers, having seen the millions of acres of grazing ranch lands that had traded hands for as 
little as twenty-five cents an acre in previous years, now viewed the land as a speculative 
commodity, increasing the impetus for farm colonization. The majority of hard-hit, struggling 
ranches, in their desperation due to drought and market woes, embraced the idea as a god-
send. Without the luxury of being able to consider the future ramifications, the ranchers' 
hand-to-mouth existence made for compounding trouble, coupled with the lack of long-term 
strategic planning. 
The arrival and quantity of farm colonies immediately unleashed an explosive, 
tense social change and created a new class order (McKay 2002). The ranch society and 
economy of the Lower Rio Grande Valley carried on with paternalistic traditions reaching 
back to Spanish colonization of the 18th Century. Although the mid-19th century witnessed 
the arrival of the Anglo-American and birth of the Anglo ranch elite, the social order followed 
the patronismo tradition and inherently remained very much a Mexican ranch society in both 
hierarchy and disposition. However, "the ready-farm communities" organized by ranchers 
and developers "transplanted societies from the Midwest" challenged the traditional social 
order's hierarchy, culture and values. The conflicting economic and labor arrangements in-
evitably led to political and racial conflict. Essentially the Mexican-Anglo ranch society, 
based on paternalistic work arrangements, contradicted the growing Anglo American farm 
society's economic and labor rationality. 
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Consequently, the very hierarchy, culture and values that had maintained the social 
order of the Mexican-Anglo elites' ranch society stood in stark contrast to those of the 
freshly transplanted Midwestern farm communities. The social changes that ensued fol- 
lowed aracial fine. The peace structure had managed to subdue unfettered racism, and its 
dismantling unleashed racism. Intense confrontations led to racial repression. The Anglo 
American farm society only stopped short of selling the Mexican-Texan as a labor commod-
ity or as a slave. 
The paternalism characteristic of the Spanish influence produced in the Mexican 
communities a natural tendency to look to the head of the ranch hierarchy or the patron for 
direction. The Anglo-American farm settler viewed the paternalistic bond as a relationship 
reminiscent of that between parent and child. The Anglo farm settler questioned the proper 
place of the Mexican-American in the new social order. The answer seemed obvious: as 
racial inferiors, they could be treated as second-class citizens. Consequently the Angio 
farm settlers insisted on a new social, economic and political arrangement and a newly de-
fined. moral order with respect to the Anglo superior and the Mexican inferior. 
The definition and establishment of an exclusive political landscape, including redefi-
nition of county boundaries, was key to facilitating the newly emerging morality (Greenberg 
2002). The political struggle reflected the confrontation between the values and traditions of 
the ranchers and new farm settlers. County boundaries were redefined in response to the 
ongoing political struggle of the divided societies. The unfolding county divisions embodied 
the separation between ranchers and farmers, with the establishment of ranch and farm 
counties. Whether the county was ranch elite or farm elite, the populations remained pre-
dominantly Mexican-American. When the ranch elite was successful in defending its values 
and traditions, the peace structure that established accommodative patterns was more or 
less continued. Where the farm settlers overthrew the ranch oligarchy, the Mexican and 
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Anglo relationship drastically transformed to meet the needs of commercial farming interest. 
"Not unexpectedly, where the farmers wrested control from the ranchers, one of their first 
measures was the disenfranchisement of Texas Mexicans, as through the White Man's Pri-
mary Association...or simply through intimidation and other informal means" (Montejano 
1999, p. 148). As such the social order depended entirely upon whether ranchers or farm-
ers controlled the county. 
The rapid development of the Lower Rio Grande Valley's farm colonies did not afford 
the well-entrenched Mexican-Anglo ranch society the necessary space or time to adjust. 
The conflict and polarization that resulted led to a creation of separate spaces or distinct 
counties embracing the old or new society. Eventually however the newcomer farmers as-
similated, as Anglo-Texans managed to produce change in the pioneer ranch country, thus 
constructing a modern economy. Brandishing all the trappings of a society possessing a 
new class order and social arrangements, the farm society introduced business standards 
and market practices that delivered dramatic social changes in economic development and 
political modernity. 
The innovations are familiar ones in the story of development. In contrast to 
the permanent workers, paternalistic service, and complacent patriarchal at-
titudes of before, the modern society was characterized by wage laborers, 
impersonal contracts, and a rational market cost; they were measurable items 
of production known as the labor market. Relations between farmers and la-
borers, in short, were thoroughly commercialized (Montejano 1999, p. 159). 
The unfolding of the farm economy's modernity and labor-market-driven economic 
development sponsored an ethnocentrism manifesting itself in terms of the division of labor 
in the farm social order, with Anglo owners and Mexican laborers. Farmers often used the 
adjective "dirty" to describe the Mexican's position as a farm laborer, perpetuating as "natu-
ral" the racial division of labor. The farm social hierarchy was predicated in racial and class 
repression. It is important to understand that in the minds of the Anglo farm settler, race and 
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class were inextricably interwoven. "When the pragmatic language of interest or control was 
not used to explain the segregated order, the language of race entered in a critical way to fil! 
out the details, to paint the color, of the regional society" (Montejano 1999, p. 222). Such 
was the case pertaining to segregated neighborhoods and schools, which further estab-
lished the norm of farm social hierarchy. For the Texas Mexican the quality of opportunities 
and life were limited through formal and informal processes. The idea of Anglo superiority 
was communicated through morals, norms and institutions with such redundancy that it 
completely permeated the entire social fabric. 
Anglo and Mexican children...understood that separate schooling meant 
separation of superior from inferior. This meaning was taught to them in 
countless lessons-the Mexican school was physically inferior, Mexican chil-
dren were issued textbooks discarded by Anglo children, Mexican teams 
were not admitted to county athletic leagues, Mexican girls could not enter 
beauty contests, and so on. The design of segregationist policies in the farm 
counties, from educational programs to residential codes, drew its force from 
the need to regulate and maintain a reservoir of cheap Mexican labor (Mon-
tejano 1999, p. 178). 
The farm society of the Lower Rio Grande Valley seized upon the racial character of 
the work force to improve its competitive position in the market. To improve his competitive 
advantage, the commercial farmer minimized costs of production by minimizing wage cost. 
Drawing on the reservoir of cheap Mexican farm labor, the world of commercial agriculture in 
the Lower Rio Grande Valley sponsored the formation of a migratory Mexican labor force. 
With seasonal fluctuations and changing market demands the needs of commercial farming 
was addressed through temporary wage labor, which led to weak Mexican-Anglo relation-
ships and resulted in a highly transitory work force and significantly limited the potential of 
the Mexican population to present an opposition, much less a united front. 
Anglos were not unified and nor did all reap benefits. One issue dividing the Anglo 
community was the use of cheap Mexican farm labor, which led to fierce debates over Mexi-
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can immigration. On the one hand wealthy large-scale farmers claimed that continued eco-
nomic growth strongly depended on the access to cheap Mexican labor; therefore they sup-
ported an open border arrangement with Mexico. In contrast the small farmers and urban 
industrial workers claimed that Anglo labor and small farmers were the key to economic de-
velopment in the region. They called for a closed border and for repatriation of those Mexi-
cans already in the Rio Grande Valley (McKay 2002). The position of the business commu-
nity depended entirely on the composition of its clientele. Big business, whose wealth was 
primarily tied to the health of commercial farming, supported the open border view. Retail-
ers depending more on the working class clients "held that agribusiness threatened to ruin 
the country and that small, diversified farming should be the model to pursue" (Montejano 
1999, p. 182) . 
Urban-industrial Society 
The debate over agribusiness versus small farmer has never been resolved; how- 
ever the heyday of political influence for the farmers began to give way to urban commercial 
interest. The urban-industrial society's corporate interests rapidly entered agribusiness, be-
coming farm owners and operators. And the insular segregated farm order found farm la-
borers emigrating to the cities and industrial employers. Coupled with an expanding profes-
sional middle class and skilled working class among Mexican-Americans, the Servicemen's 
Readjustment Act of 1944 delivered damaging blows to the farm society of the Lower Rio 
Grande Valley. 
By the 21St century the Rio Grande Valle melted into a eculiar urban and rural Y p 
combination (Vigness and Odintz 2002). Some regions developed as resort centers and 
others became winter havens for northerners escaping cold weather. Yet other regions 
benefited from the development of `maquiladoras' giant manufacturing centers initiated by 
the Mexican government in the 1960s to generate economic development along the border. 
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These industrial plants used low-wage assembly and manufacturing to attract corporations 
(Vigness and Odintz 2002). In addition some regions benefited from easing commercial re-
strictions between Mexico and the United States in the form of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (1990). 
Agribusiness, nonetheless, maintained its position as the economic engine for the 
majority of the Rio Grande Valley. "Cotton, grain sorghums, and sugarcane were leading 
crops in the Valley, and the region continued to be the center of citrus production and the 
most important area of vegetable production in the state" (Vigness and Odintz 2002). Con-
sequently, agricultural labor has remained the profession of a high number of community 
residents. Although agricultural employment opportunities are plentiful, they remain low 
paying. 
The socio-economic dichotomy of the Rio Grande Valley is the enduring character of 
the region. Evidence of economic and social progress is undisputable yet a stone's throw 
away, Third World conditions continue to thrive. High levels of unemployment and under-
employment have always plagued the Rio Grande Valley as a region and are likely to con-
tinue in the foreseeable future. The seasonal nature of the local economy, both in agricul-
ture and tourism, is unquestionably a culprit for the extraordinarily high concentrated pov-
erty. Yet it is somewhat ironic that although higher paying professional opportunities are 
available, the workforce does not possess the necessary skills. The vicious cycle of poverty 
is persistent in the Rio Grande Valley. 
Traditional "boss politics" governance structures not unique to the Rio Grande Valley 
have persevered in the face of historical processes changing the power holders. The sys-
tem of `compadrismo' continues to endure. The political organization, well-to-do families 
and businesspeople of the Rio Grande Valley embrace the system that shelters their inter-
ests (Anders 1999). If nothing else, the system has become more efficient. Indeed the pa-
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ternalistic services reminiscent of the feudalistic obligations of Mexican `patrones' to their 
`peones' still provide relief to the marginalized during hard times, which are frequent. Poor 
Rio Grande Valley residents consistently submit to the political manipulation of the patrones. 
In affect poor Rio Grande Valley residents generally accept a dependent role, which gener- 
ates aspirit "if God wishes'. 
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Chapter 4. Methodology 
The research unfolds in a case study format. A case study aims to "shed light on a 
phenomenon, which is the processes, events, persons, or things of interest to the re-
searcher" (Gall et al, 1996, p. 545). The case selected is in some manner typical of the 
broader phenomenon (Vogt, 1999, p. 34). The unit of analysis is the phenomenon's fea-
tures that are available for sampling (Gall et al, 1996). In our case the phenomenon is citi- 
zen/community participation with respect to implementation of community development 
goals. The case is the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone. The focus is the community 
development process. The unit of analysis is the entire EZ. 
Case studies generate an understanding and potential explanations fora phenome-
non through the participants who have experienced, as well as witnessed, the social proc-
esses. I tried to reconstruct the development of the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment 
Zone's evolving governing body and present it as it functioned at the time of the study (June 
2000). I examined documents and interviewed people who were instrumental in the Rio 
Grande Valley Empowerment Zone's formation, as well as those participants currently expe-
riencing the consequences, including the key players (past and present members of the Rio 
Grande Valley Empowerment Zone's Governing Board) 
Research Question &Hypothesis 
Many contemporary antipoverty programs in the United States require effective citi-
zen participation and collaboration between the local community and representatives of the 
governing agency. Yet the requirement has not led in most cases to effective participation 
and collaboration. How do some persistently poor rural communities gain resident and 
community cooperation for community based antipoverty programs? 
The following framework helps to shed light on how the processes operate to ,generate 
resident and community cooperation. New cultural capital (decision-making structure: for-
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mation and composition of the governing body; meeting location and hour) challenges his- 
torical legacies which in turn influences the level of social organization (community engage- 
ment: outreach attitudes and activities) and as a result affects the implementation of devel-
opment goals (citizen participation and community-based partnerships). The following gen- 
eral hypothesis is used in this research: 
The compositional characteristics of the governing body influence the level of 
community engagement, which in turn effects whether citizens and community-
based partnerships are involved in the implementation of the Empowerments 
Zone's goals. 
Selection of Respondents and Interviews 
The gatekeeper, Bonnie Gonzalez, Executive Director of the Rio Grande Valley 
Empowerment Zone Corporation, identified a list of stakeholders. The key participants in 
this study are the past and present members of the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone 
Governing Board. I therefore conducted interviews (n=23) with representatives of the Gov-
erning Board. The interview schedules used was derived by the North Central Regional 
Center for Rural Development team and was applied in two other sitess. Interviews were 
taped with the permission of the participants. 
During the semi-structured face-to-face interviews, the interviewees were asked the 
following questions, which were also asked in case studies in two Enterprise Communities: 
1. Please describe your involvement with the empowerment zone. 
2. Getting the designation of an empowerment zone takes a lot of effort on the part of a 
lot of people. Do you know of other occasions when the community came together 
to make things happen? 
3. How would you describe the original strategic visions and the values of the 
empowerment? 
4. What changes have you observed in the strategic vision? 
5. Are the values and the overall vision still valid today? 
s  See Appendix A. 
s The interview schedule was also used in Central Appalachia Empowerment Zone, West Virginia and 
Enterprise Communities of Josephine County, Oregon. 
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6. Could you give me some examples how the day-to-day activities of the 
empowerment zone reflected strategic vision? 
7. How has the empowerment zone encouraged citizens to play an active role in local 
governmental issues? Can you give examples? 
8. How has the empowerment zone shown concern for those who are poor? Can you 
give examples? 
9. Can you give examples of local and state governments/non-profit and nongovern-
mental organizations/business and industry cooperated with the empowerment 
zone? 
10. What criticisms have you heard governmental officials express about the 
empowerment zone? 
11. What praise have you heard governmental officials in the area express about the 
empowerment zone? 
12. When did you first become involved in community development activities? 
13. Why did you get involved? 
14. What changes have you seen in the number of empowerment zone area residents 
who volunteer or participate in community activities? 
15. Have you observed geographic areas within the empowerment zone where residents 
participate more or less than others? 
16. How many individuals from outside the empowerment zone area have helped im-
plement the empowerment zone strategic plan? 
17. Do you find that meetings are held at convenient times? 
18. do you find that the meetings are held at convenient places? 
19. Has anyone mentioned to you that they have been unable to attend the 
empowerment zone meetings or events due to time and place? 
20. Have you noticed newcomers to the area become active in the empowerment zone 
projects or leadership? 
21. Have you noticed long-term residents who have a history of community activism be-
come active in the empowerment zone effort? 
22. Have you noticed long-term residents not previously active in the community become 
active as a result of the empowerment zone effort? 
23. How important is it to involve all persons and groups in the community, in commu-
nity-based poverty reduction and community development efforts? 
24. How has the empowerment zone tried to include more persons and groups of the 
community within its decision-making process? 
25. What have you observed the empowerment zone do to reduce poverty? 
Data Analysis and Reporting 
The open-ended questions generated what Fetterman has called "thick description", 
rich personal observations offered by the respondent (1989, p. 114). The act of interviewing 
can reveal the underlying feelings a participant harbors while discussing the immediate is-
sues of interest. With this in mind, the data was categorized according to emerging patterns 
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and meaning. For example, the responses provided to a question embodying the issue of 
outreach activities were sorted as ̀ active', `passive' or `not applicable'. 
As the interviews were conducted, I began to sketch a story of the Rio Grande Valley 
Empowerment Zone Governing Board's evolution and its actions with respect to involving 
the community. A case study reveals the researcher's perspective, calling upon the reader 
to agree or disagree with the views expressed (Gall et al., 1996). Through the use of exten-
sive quotations my hope is to deliver a sense of the challenges faced by the participants 
given the local cultural capital. As such I used a narrative storytelling approach to describe 
the unfolding process of interest. 
The Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone 
The EZ/EC was designed to empower people and communities through partner-
ships, working together to create the opportunity for sustainable community and economic 
development. With this in mind, after reviewing the 220 community applications for Round 
One, three sites were selected by USDA as Empowerment Zones and 30 sites were desig-
nated Enterprise Communities. The Rio Grande Valley qualified as one of three designated 
Empowerment Zones that met more of the eligibility criteria than the 30 designated Enter-
prise Communities. 
The Setting 
The Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone consists of three noncontiguous areas 
within four counties. 
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The Cameron County census tract is the largest single geographic area of the zone and is 
centered in Port Isabel. The Willacy and Hidalgo County sub-zones are contiguous and rep- 
resent alarge portion of what remains of the zone. Starr County's small recently incorpo-
rated municipality, Rio Grande City, accounts for the remaining geographic area of the zone. 
The Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone covers an area of 227 square miles and a 
population of 29,859; approximately 52 percent of this population lives below the poverty 
line (Executive Summary 1998). 
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The Composition of the Governing Board Variable 
In terms of community development, the internal colonial concept sheds I'rght on the 
origins of political divisions that influence decision-making bodies and processes in the de-
veloping community. The Internal Colonialism concept incorporates history and as such, it 
is important to understand the local historical processes. Through these historical proc-
esses, we see that the composition of local governing bodies and process reflect the lega-
cies of the internal colonial situation. These legacies are masked in tradition and handed 
down from generation to generation. They become part of the culture and understanding of 
society and each citizen's role in that society in what we term `cultural capital'. 
The emerging cultural capital stemming from the legacies of the internal colonial 
situation establishes well-defined social roles and expectations. Boss politics is a legacy 
that has dominated the political organization of the Rio Grande Valley by way of manipula-
tion, bribery and coercion. Well-to-do families and businesspeople often embrace the politi-
cal boss system to secure special favors from local government. To the Mexican-American 
laborers, the South Texas political bosses offer paternalistic services modeled after the feu-
dalistic obligations of Mexican `patrones' to their `peones'. In return for relief during hard 
times and the financing of special social occasions, poor Mexicans submit to the political 
control of the bosses. This system of social organization, compadrismo, is known as the 
"Uld Boy Network" in other settings. The Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone initiative is 
embedded in this political and social setting. 
The North Central Regional Center for Rural Development identified 11 of the 33 
Round 1 EZ/EC rural communities as "new empowerment paradigm" sites. The North Cen-
tral Regional Center for Rural Development's treatment of the "old `top-down' paradigm and 
new `bottom-up' empowerment paradigm" highlights the issue of established vested interest 
versus community involvement within the community development processes. 
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In most instances in the `old paradigm sites', the governing body was appointed by 
the original lead entities and organizers that applied for Empowerment Zone status, such as 
a partnership of the mayor, local chamber of commerce, units of city and county govern-
ments, and community organizations (Strategic Planning Guide 1998). The implications for 
the communities characterized as old paradigm sites are the continuation of past practices. 
These areas relied on top-down process and invited only those participants and partner-
ships traditionally engaged in economic development processes. The old paradigm ap-
proach ignores the potentially beneficial involvement of residents of low-income census 
tracks in the planning and implementation processes. Thus, they do not take into consid-
eration community-based assets and fail to facilitate a sense of ownership within the devel-
opment process. "An imposed set of partner in the `partnerships' is much less likely to result 
in changed social and economic conditions, especially if the unequal power differentials 
continue" (Aigner et al. 2001, p. 497). 
However for those communities characterized as "new empowerment paradigm" 
sites, the initiating coalition or umbrella organizations were challenged to adopt a grassroots 
philosophy and bottom-up approach to place low-income residents of the target census 
tracts as "citizens" in an empowering position to elect representatives on the governing 
board in order to oversee the process (Aigner et al. 2001, p. 497). In some cases this chal-
lenge was part of a conscious, purposeful effort. In others it was simply accidental. Re-
gardless, the underlying assumption is that broad representation generates credibility and 
facilitates legitimate ties and relationships to the stakeholders necessary to create a more 
adequate community participation foundation. A governing body composed of members 
who effectively represent the stakeholders participating in the development and implemen-
tation of the strategic plan is more likely to result in changed social and economic condi-
tions. "For `partnerships' between marginalized citizens and local elected officials as an or-
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ganizational structure for community development to promote social inclusion and sustain 
community development, many agree that local citizens must be actively involved in gov-
ernance to become empowered" (Aigner et al. 2001, p. 497}. 
As one of the eleven communities characterized as a "new empowerment paradigm" 
site, the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone challenged the cultural capital associated 
with the internal colonial situation. How did the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone 
move away from the old paradigm arrangement of governance and representation? To 
understand the changing cultural capital, I used data gathered in June 2002 from interviews 
(n=23) conducted with past and present members of the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment 
Zone governing bodies to create a narrative to tell the story of "how" the processes that cre-
ated this possibility came into being. 
The Social Organization Variables 
Social disorganization is a product of uneven historical development that influences 
the very character of the community, as well as the behavior of community members. The 
concept's underlying principle is that the presence of social structural conditions dictates the 
abundance and type of intra-community and inter-community ties, formal and informal, 
which facilitate the ability to address common problems such as persistent poverty. The in-
tra-community and inter-community ties advocated by the social organization concept reflect 
what is termed bonding and bridging social capital. Community-based bonding social capi-
tal facilitates access to and exchange of local information. However, the implementation 
and success of a development program has depended on effective linkages between local 
movement organizers and externally based partners and institutions: bridging social capital 
(Bursik and Grasmick 1995, p. 118). 
In an environment with changing cultural capital, is social organization possible? If 
so, how is social organization fostered? To understand the efforts to generate social or-
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ganization I once more relied on data gathered from the interviews conducted with past and 
present members of the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone Governing Board to create 
a narrative to tell the story of "how" the outreach processes were created and the perceived 
achievements. In addition, I used information from a database consisting of quantitative and 
qualitative data gathered about each participating EZ/EC community, in cooperative agree-
ment with USDA and the North Central Regional Center for Rural Development, to facilitate 
an idea how the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone has faired in the outreach proc-
esses and achievement when viewed against the other Empowerment Zone/Enterprise 
Communities. 
A community can create economic and social opportunities only if there are residents 
or partners who are aware of sources of assistance and are in a position to create functional 
relationships (Bursik and Grasmick 1995, p. 122). With this in mind I used outreach activi-
ties to gauge the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone's propensity to engage the com-
munity, attempting to make the community more aware and active with respect to the im-
plementation process. 
In the setting of the Empowerment Zone the level of social organization related to 
citizen participation and community-based partnerships is measurable in the following man-
ner. With respect to citizen participation, if residents of poor communities are not able to 
actively engage in community development programs, the ability of local ties to formally and 
informally take part in development processes such as planning and implementation will be 
significantly weakened. This limits the community's ability to develop mutually-serving rela-
tionships with institutions and thereby influences the levels of residential satisfaction with 
policies and services rendered (Warner and Rountree 1997, p. 523). Lack of citizen partici-
pation with respect to policies and services further marginalizes the community-based social 
ties of poor communities. Institutional programs and policies, consequently, may be imple-
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mented which further negatively influence the community's ability to organize and regulate 
behavior given the lack of stakeholder perspective and guidance. 
To grasp the level of citizen participation with respect to implementation of the Rio 
Grande Valley Empowerment Zone's benchmark activities, I use a measure developed by 
Stephen Aigner for the North Central Regional Center for Rural Development. Accordingly, 
citizen participation is measured in percentage by counting the number of individual citizens 
who serve on the RGVEZ's governing body, regardless of election or appointment, and di-
viding that individual sum by the total number of members sitting on the governing body. 
The total number of members includes both individual citizens and representatives of par-
ticipating entities such as local, county and state government or the market sector. 
With respect to community-based partnerships, the development process ideally 
strives for a balance between internal and external resources. Unquestionably, community-
based internal social capital facilitates a certain level of economic and social opportunities. 
Yet the important contribution of external actors has been recognized in the literature on re-
source mobilization. As such, for the measurement of the community-based partnerships 
variable, I used data collected from the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone Corpora-
tion's chief executive officer. In 1997 the NCRCRD conducted phone-interviews with the 
CEO to gain insight into the existence of community-based partnerships. The CEO was 
asked to identify those instances in which either citizen or organization representatives 
served as partners and had contributed resources towards the implementation of strategic 
vision activities. Part of the interview process requested that the CEO examine a list of 26 
categories representing organizational bodies and asked if each type existed in the local 
community. If so, had representatives of the organization type participated in the imple-
mentation process? 
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With respect to the organizational types the EZ1EC research team formulated a cate-
gorization scheme as follows: 
State: officials with city, county, state government, cooperative extension 
agents, and members of the state's rural development council, staff with a re-
gional planning commission, and staff with a regional or state level depart-
ment of commerce or department of economic development. 
Civil Society: labor organizations, officials or representatives of universities or 
postsecondary educational institutions, youth groups, local environmental 
groups or chapters, civic leagues or concerned citizen's groups, heritage 
groups (race, ethnicity, women's groups, churches or ecumenical groups, and 
parent-teacher organizations. 
Market: local development commissions, private businesses including banks 
and the chamber of commerce, small business development centers, pro-
moters of main street commercial interests, and utilities. 
The number of types was then summed for each of the three categories, for those catego-
rized as partners. Next, in order to measure the level of civil society representation under-
lying the community-based partnerships, the partners from the state and the market catego-
ries were summed. The sum categorized as Civil Society was divided by the State or Mar-
ket sum. 
The next chapter offers a summary of the Rio Grande Valley's history to provide a 
contextual background. 
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Chapter 5. Findings 
The Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone includes census tracts in four counties 
(Cameron, Hidalgo, Starr and Willacy), an area of 227 square miles with a population of 
29,859. Of this total population, 88% is Hispanic and 7% is Caucasian. 
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This region's poverty rate is a staggering 52%, as indicated by the Rio Grande Valley, Texas 
Empowerment Zone's Executive Summary (1998). The zone's landscape contrasts sharply, 
ranging from coastal views to sprawling quasi-desert rangeland. These regions are popu-
lated by both the prosperous and the destitute. For instance, well-to-do tourists visiting the 
Gulf Coast share a waterfront view with poorly educated and out-of -work or underpaid tour-
ist industry laborers. Similarly, enormous and profitable cattle ranches sprawl for thousands 
of acres not far from the overcrowded poorer areas know as "colonial", which often lack ba-
sic infrastructure such as running water and electricity. 
In each county the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone is proceeding with proj-
ects funded and community dollars leveraged, but there remain critics, such as Cruz Torres, 
associate professor of rural sociology at Texas A&M University, who suggest that commu-
nity involvement and capacity-building remain rather low. "The difficult philosophical ques-
tion is: Are we really empowering people or signing onto an old boys' system?" Indeed the 
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"old boys' system" or the "compadre system" is a creation of historical processes not unique 
to the Rio Grande Valley. It is the cultural capital that generates the governance structures 
that are predominant in the Rio Grande Valley. it is the cultural capital that hinders the spirit 
of citizen participation and ultimately social organization. Citizens have become accus-
tomed to the paternalistic services replicating characteristics of the feudalistic obligation of 
Mexican "patrones'' to their "peones". 
In Their Own Words: The Story Behind the Governing Board 
The story begins in 1993 when a representative for the Rio Grande Valley Chamber 
of Commerce heard that a new federal government Empowerment Zone Enterprise Com-
munity Initiative (EZEC) aimed at communities experiencing persistent, concentrated pov-
erty was in the pipeline. He immediately notified four county judges' and they greeted the 
opportunity for economic development, or at least an injection of monies, with tentative op-
timism. They agreed to organize a meeting with the counties' commissioners$ for the pur-
poses of establishing a memorandum of understanding and cooperation between the coun-
ties. All participants were equally concerned about the economic feasibility of pursuing the 
EZ/EC initiative. A Rio Grande Valley banker recalls: 
I believe, if I remember correctly, this was initiated through Bill Summers at 
the Rio Grande Partnership (Chamber of Commerce), and he notified the 
County Judges and the County Judges assigned you know who to start look-
ing at this stuff about Empowerment Zone that the government is going to 
come out with or whatever. As soon as that came out, I got involved with 
some people at the county level and just to see what it was about if it was 
worth while acting in conjunction with the other counties to form the Valley 
Empowerment Zone, and so I got involved at the very initial stages of it. 
The Texas Constitution vests broad judicial and administrative powers in the position of county 
judge, who presides over afive-member commissioners' court, which has budgetary and administra-
8ive authority over county government operations (Texas Association of Counties). 
Four commissioners, each elected from a quarter of the county's population, serve along with the 
county judge on the commissioners' court. In addition to assuring that county roads are maintained, 
commissioners vote with the county judge to set the budget for all county departments and adopt a 
tax rate (Texas Association of Counties). 
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Once it was decided that benefits outweighed the initial financial cost, the counties 
prepared to pursue what they viewed as an economic development initiative. Next they 
designated a steering committee to put together the necessary paperwork. The county 
judges or commissioners appointed all the county delegates. !n Cameron County however, 
things unexpectedly worked differently. An important business figure in the community was 
approached to participate. He, however, explained that he would participate only if other 
community advocates were involved. In the words of a Cameron County member of that 
initial steering committee: 
Each of the counties was to elect four representatives to the board. We were 
the only one of the four counties that did not have their member appointed by 
the county judges. We said, no, I was one of them Father O'Brien was the 
other one, and Bob Cornelison was the other one. And we had one banker, 
from Harlingen. And these four were our main representatives. Unfortu-
nately for some of the other counties, they got sidetracked or bogged down 
into looking at people who are all selected because they were associated with 
the county judges. And they ended up with a fine group of lawyers but not 
people who were down to earth. We were assisted by Valley Interfaith, and 
Valley Interfaith said, "Fine, great, that's what we need: people that are sen-
sitive to the needs of the people---this is the way we're going". 
In this way the Cameron County delegation on the steering committee represented 
the only civil society presence in the application process on the steering committee. The 
Cameron County delegation had connections to Valley Interfaith. Valley Interfaith is a com-
munity-based organization composed of over 40 churches and schools, and represents ap-
proximately 60,000 families in southeast Texas. It was initiated through Catholic leadership 
with the help of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF). The IAF has long been considered 
one of the strongest networks of community organizations in the country. 
~s 
Composition of 
Steering Committee for 
Application Process 
TOTAL 
16 Members 
Representatives for. No. of 
Seats 
County Judges 4 
County 
Commissioners 
4 
Market Sector 5 
Total 13 
Representatives for. No. of 
Seats 
Advocacy Group 1 
Community Service 1 
Ciub 
Community Literacy 1 
Group 
Tota! 3 
Figure 5.1 
Ironically the EZJEC initiative called for community participation, however it only al-
lotted six months for the applicatian process, which included developing a strategic plan and 
fundraising as demanded in the legislation and by the USDA. Over the course of six months 
the steering committee worked diligently with a consultant to develop a comprehensive pro-
posal for submission to the office of the Secretary of Agriculture. Faced by daunting time 
and financial constraints, the steering committee, encouraged by the three civil society dele-
gates, organized community meetings through the grassroots network available through 
Valley Interfaith. This was done in order to construct a plan reflecting community needs, 
versus a simple wish list focused on economic development. A local newspaper reporter 
recalls the events that helped generate the application and strategic plan. 
There were quite a few meetings held trying to get this together in the various 
communities. Mr. Cornelison and various people who were trying to get it 
going and without them there it was just the local government entities them-
selves talking about it, because they were called upon to contribute funds (I 
forget the amount now} to qualify and to send Bob to Washington, or you 
know, wherever it was he needed to go to facilitate the process. And for the 
application itself, they had to come up with the strategic plan to even be con-
sidered. That meant a lot of meetings with a lot of people. You had to have 
the community involved or you didn't have a strategic plan. Many, many, 
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many meetings and there were some detractors too. There were some peo-
ple here who thought it was another government handout program. 
The comments of another steering committee member reflect the diversity of civil society's 
participation throughout the application process. 
We had to raise $220,000.00. I helped raise the money to apply for the ap-
plication. In fact the parish put in $2,000.00 and then the Valley Interfaith, of 
which I am a member of, put in $10,000.00. 
In December 1994 the Rio Grande Valley received federal designation as one of only 
three Rural Empowerment Zones. By week's end four county judges had appointed 10 
members to the zone-wide decision-making body known locally as the Board of Directors. 
The comments offered by one of the county judges inadvertently captures the tendency of 
the area's patriarchal cultural capital. 
Yeah, I appointed them all. The first night, after we got the go-ahead, "you 
have been funded," 1 started getting my committees together, and I called a 
meeting in the community. Forty-five people showed up. "Now get into 
groups of nines or fives or however many members you want." I think I told 
them, I said, "Get in groups of 9, that's five board members. Out of each 
group of 9 you pick a spokesperson. This is your contact; this is the man or 
woman you go tell what is done. Follow through with our wishes"...and that 
was all. Other than the only things that I can say right now as a politician, 
and we finally got some money, but I don't know how much they've put in the 
empowerment zone. 
The appointed sub-zone seats were distributed as follows: Hidalgo three, Cameron three, 
Willacy two and Starr two seats. The four appointing judges and an appointed advisor filled 
the remaining five seats of the Regional Board of Directors. 
The Board of Directors fit the old top-down paradigm. Although civil society repre-
sentatives occupied a few seats, due in large part to their contributions throughout the appli-
cation process, the county judges appointed seats to those representatives of the market 
and state more in line with previous economic development ventures. The civil society 
board members campaigned and facilitated a greater awareness of the prevailing cultural 
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capital (the compadre system) in which the Empowerment Zone is embedded. According to 
some interviewees, one sub-zone representative advocated the need to take the necessary 
steps to secure the fullest potential of the initiative, beginning with the removal of politicians 
and their cronies. His position mirrors his membership with both the Industrial Area Foun-
dation and Valley Interfaith. He explained: 
Now I had a hard time getting Valley Inter-Faith into it and they told me (some 
member of the Board of Directors) I couldn't be on the board if I was a mem-
ber of Valley Interfaith...) said you're gone, I am going to be a member. I was 
right and they were so glad I was, because it helped them. 
At the first Board of Directors' meeting the members agreed that this was an oppor-
tunity to attempt a new approach. The emergence of a new governance structure (i.e. cul-
tural capital) was on the horizon. Through majority consensus, the Board agreed to remove 
all members currently also holding politically elected offices from the Board of Directors. In 
addition it was agreed that membership would be reduced from 15 to nine members9 giving 
each county/sub-zone two seats and therefore equal representation. 
Table 5.1 
Reconstituted Regional Board of Directors 
New Empowerment Paradigm of Governance 
Sub-zone Represented 
(No Elected Officials) 
Number of Seats 
Hidalgo County 2 
Cameron County 2 
W illacy County 2 
Starr County 2 
Rio Grande Valley 
Empowerment Zone 
Corporation CEO 
1 
Total 9 
s See Appendix B. 
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The new structure worked as follows. Each sub-zone through its advisory committee 
elected/nominated two representatives, with the remaining seat reserved for the Rio Grande 
Valley Empowerment Zone Corporation's CEO. In the words of one Board member, 
Only government officials were critical the ones who wanted to be on that 
board. Again, I am not going to name names, but there are a few of them at 
the local level and at the county level who very much wanted to be on the 
board or wanted to have a representative on the board, so that they could 
have a say on where the money went with the idea in mind that, "Yeah, my 
brother-in-law's in the construction business. We'll give him that contract". 
They have been critical because they wanted to get something for them-
selves out of the process and they were barred from doing so. 
In this manner the Board of Directors took steps toward fostering citizen participation 
on the Board. We created ordinal categories of level of citizen participation on the Govern-
ing Board for each of the 33 Round 1 Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Communities. 
C itiz e n Participation -O n Board o f D ire c to rs 
Score Description No. of EZ/EC 
S fte s in 
Category 
t Low on Citizen Participation Variables 14 
2 Medium and m fixed results on Citizen Participation 
Variables 
8 
3 M i~h on inclusion, citizens on board and cam m unity 
residents among electors 
t t 
Table 5.2 
The Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone received a score of 3 on citizen participation, 
based on all variables associated to citizen participation (percentage of citizens to total 
board-1997, percentage of new citizens on 97 board, old paradigm or new paradigm, elec-
tors of citizens on board). 
Likewise for each of the 33 Round i , Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Communities 
we summed the number of types within each of the three categories (state, civil society and 
market) for the members of the governing boards. Next, to develop a measure of balance 
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between civil society delegates on the board relative to the state or the market delegate, we 
categorized the ratios. 
C ivil Society Board Members 
Relative to State & M arket M em bers 
Civic Society To 
State Members 
No. EZ/EC 
Sites in 
Category 
Low (00-.75) 14 
Medium _(1 .fl-1 ,43) 1 0 
H igh (1 .6 -8.0) 9 
Civil Society To 
Market Members 
No. EZIEC 
Sites in 
Category 
Low (00-.75) 9 
Medium (1 .0-1 .43) 1 3 
H igh (1 .6-8,0) 9 
Table 5.3 
In the case of the civil society-to-state ratio the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone was 
classified a 2, the medium category. For the civil society-to-market ratio the Rio Grande 
Valley Empowerment Zone was placed in the high category. 
We also distinguished 11 of the 33 Round 1 EZEC sites as "new empowerment 
paradigm". After the change was made in the Board of Director structure, the Rio Grande 
Valley Empowerment Zone joined the "new empowerment paradigm" category. According 
to the conversations held with various Board of Director members, the new selection proc-
ess made it more likely that those on the Board were active members of civil society or affili-
ated organizations, or involved in community development activities. Furthermore the mem-
bers, according to Board of Director members, were more likely to be volunteers versus 
serving on the board as part of their paid employment. Finally, members of the Board of Di-
rectors were more likely to have a diverse professional background i.e. nonprofits, market 
and government/public institutions). Contrary to the appointment method used to construct 
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the initial Board of Directors, the new approach embodies the principles that underlie the 
"new empowerment paradigm", thus producing a broader representative governing body 
that generates more legitimate and transparent relationships with citizens. 
Although largely unplanned, the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone challenged 
the prevalent cultural capital associated to governance. The "patron -peon" paternalistic 
structure gave way to more community-based governance structure built on the tenets of 
inclusiveness and transparency, both of which are reflected in outreach activities. 
Social Organization: Outreach &Community Participation 
The force or direction a community program or project takes should be inclusive in 
the sense that it takes into account the expressed opinions of all community citizens and 
groups. This almost never occurs. Before addressing questions about outreach, citizen par-
ticipation, partnerships and decision-making, I wanted to determine if those directly involved 
with the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone felt it necessary to involve a!I persons and 
groups of the community or if they believed that they could go at it alone. I therefore posed 
the following question to the community and governing board (23) representatives: How im-
portant is it to involve all persons and groups of the community? A clear majority (83%} 
voiced that they believed it "important" for the community development process to be inclu-
sive. In the words of one Hidalgo delegate: 
I can have you come to my house everyday for fish dinner, would it be better 
if I just teach you how to fish. That would take care of your needs and the 
same thing with community. 
Worded somewhat differently yet embodying the same message, one Willacy sub-zone rep-
resentative explained: 
To empower people I think that at some point, and I don't mean in the sense, 
"Here's money, go solve your problem." I mean empower in the sense of in-
forming, making the person more knowledgeable about the realities. When 
someone says, "Well, you know my next door neighbor has a weedy lot, and I 
don't give a shit". You may not care that rats and snakes go to your property. 
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But that rat or snake may bite your kid so you have a vested interest. But it's 
about empowering the citizens to recognize that they're the ones that are 
going to solve their own problems. 
Although it was encouraging to hear that inclusiveness was held with such high es-
teem, we who have worked at the grassroots level of development know that a notion or 
idea such as this at the outset is not always seen in practice. Repeatedly, community and 
Governing Board members insisted that the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone Board 
had time and time again demonstrated a determined and active role to engage community 
citizens and groups to participate in decision-making processes and the future of their com-
munity. The Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone invited more people and community 
groups through the use of information dissemination, town hall type receptions and meet-
ings, and grassroots organizational support. 
For those that considered the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone's strategies to 
include more persons and groups of the community and thus be "active", one approach they 
identified was the dissemination of information associated with the goals and processes and 
the ultimate purpose of the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone for the community. A 
Cameron Sub-Zone representative explained the strategy he had witnessed and practiced. 
...when we were working through the plan and as we were bringing the proj-
ects forward I would write stories in the local paper, generate consensus and 
listen to the calls. Obviously we would talk about these projects in front of the 
Economic Development Council at City Hall and that would get into the pa-
per. I would talk about projects at the rotary club for the business community. 
We have had meetings with Kiwanis, anywhere that people would gather. Of 
course, obviously Father Joe talked projects at the church and church com-
mittees, Calvin and Pat went to their individual committees10 and recruited 
people to serve on education, training, housing and clinic committees and 
people and we depend on Rosa, because she is on the Valley Interfaith 
board. 
Along this line a Hidalgo Catholic Priest provided a similar example: 
10 Individual committees refer to the working groups within the Empowerment Zone designated spe-
cific benchmark activity development. 
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Well the thing is, I have the advantage that I serve two churches, so when it 
comes to announcements, they get it right from the horse's mouth. You 
know, we are having this meeting, if you want to advance your city I would 
suggest that you attend. It is an open meeting, etc. And then we have good 
cooperation from the school districts. They will send flyers out with the kids. 
Time and time again the members of the Governing Board demonstrate that they have di-
rect and consistent contact with the community stakeholders through religious reunions, 
professional and service provider meetings, and the media. 
Another method pointed out by community and governing representatives was the 
practice of open town hall meetings. -One Hidalgo sub-zone member explained that "By in-
viting people, by having some of the committees invite other people to meetings and recep-
tions, and things like that. We sort of espouse the projects". Similarly a Starr sub-zone 
member added, 
They did something, you know, in my opinion it was good, and it was a step 
in the right direction when they started these town meetings. They had town 
meetings in all communities. In fact, I was there and the spin off was great. 
The first town meeting we had, we had a tremendous turnout. And at that 
point, you know we were encouraged and assisted in identifying the needs in 
our community, and then prioritizing, and this was done with the people... 
And then, you know, we subsequently had other meetings, and ...what we 
formed our citizen committee. 
Given that town hall meetings are powerful tools for community organizing, I asked 
the community and governing body representatives two questions related to meetings. 
First, we asked, do you find that meetings are held at convenient times? Of those 
interviewed 83% responded "yes" the meetings are held at convenient times. A Starr sub-
zone member, however, pointed to a somewhat common underlying sentiment among those 
interviewed. 
I think sometimes, no. I think that if we are truly, truly wanting to have as 
many people—to maximize the opportunity that when people show up, I think 
they would have to get an afternoon or evening meeting. 
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In the case of the Starr sub-zone meetings, they are held during the lunch hour in a restau-
rant's meeting room. 
Then, we asked, do you find that meetings are held in convenient places? The ma-
jority of respondents (78%) answered "yes" they believed the meetings were held in an ap-
propriate place. Once more, however, a Willacy County representative, answered similarly: 
Not necessarily. i think, if you are a part of any board that deals with public 
money and deals with empowering people, I think that if you are true to those 
principles, it means that you have a meeting at a place, at a church area or at 
a place where people don't feel as threatened by the formal setting or envi-
ronment, (think that would and the timing, you know, like at 6:00. A place 
where people don't feel it's too formal and they feel threatened. 
In addition to the information dissemination and town hall meetings initiated by the 
governing board, the Rio Grand Valley Empowerment Zone Corporation also demonstrated 
efforts to engage community citizens and groups through their day-to-day activities. I asked 
community and governing board representatives, could you give some examples where the 
Empowerment Zone day-to-day activities might reflect the strategic vision/plan? The major-
ity of respondents (55%) provided an answer that positively portrayed the day-to-day activi-
ties of the Empowerment Zone. A Willacy sub-zone member offered the following example: 
To give an example, where 1 live the empowerment zone does provide staff 
support when citizens have neighborhood or community meetings, when they 
have questions about what potential resources are out there that they could 
happen to bring in. This is Sebastian we're talking about an unincorporated 
city. And people come together to address issues and community leaders 
say, "What can we do?" and it's easy for them to pick up the phone and call 
the empowerment zone office and say, you know, "Can you provide direction 
on this? 
In the mix of Round 1 Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Communities, the Rio Grande 
Valley Empowerment Zone, due to its efforts, qualified as part of the 42% of communities 
categorized "active" with respect to their overall outreach efforts. 
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Citizen Participation-In Implementation 
Although outreach activities are extremely important in order to engage community 
members, we have to look at the outcome. Did the activities bear results? Did citizen par-
ticipation increase? After all, outreach is part of a wider plan, specifically, recruitment of citi-
zen participation for implementation of the strategic plan. With this in mind, I posed several 
questions to community and governing board representatives in order to gauge the per-
ceived level of citizen participation of longtime and new residents. When asked what 
changes they had seen in the number of Empowerment Zone area residents who volunteer 
or participate in community activities, the majority of respondents (61 %) reported a per-
ceived increase in the number of Empowerment Zone area residents that participate in 
community activities, 22% of the respondents reported no perceived change and 17% re-
ported adecrease. Testimony offered by a Willacy sub-zone member highlights the per-
ceived increase. 
It's been nothing but impressive. I would think that several years ago, before 
the empowerment zones came into play, there was no interest whatsoever on 
the part of citizens in the community to address anything. There was a — I 
don't think they felt that they could make a difference, collectively. I think that 
has changed. I think they feel like things can happen if we work together. 
Likewise a Cameron sub-zone member describes how volunteers supported aclean-up 
campaign: 
Well, I'm going to show you a copy of this letter from the president of our en-
vironmental council. It talks about a "trash bash" in the context of some other 
projects. You see, we had a tremendous event. Ended up picking up about 
450 tons of garbage and trash in that neighborhood about 700 used tires. It 
was the first project like this that people who lived in that community had ever 
gotten involved in as volunteers. It was very, very successful. 
All citizens do not participate equally. When asked if they had noticed long-term 
residents not previously involved in the community become active in the community, 66% 
reported that they had observed an increase. A Starr Sub-Zone representative replied: 
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Yes. I was real surprised, because the people who got the meeting together 
asked me to help them put it together because they do not speak English, but 
they knew empowerment zone was something that they could participate in, 
and they are in their late forties and not speaking English and yet they 
brought their neighbors and everything together at their house. 
A Cameron Sub-zone member explained how a partner facilitated participation from a long 
time citizen who had not been particularly active. 
I think that's where you go back to Valley Interfaith, where they're able to get 
people who have not been involved... involved. And they serve as leaders, 
and there's a guy by the name of Guillermo who is now very involved, and I 
was very pleased to see that. 
Seventy-two percent of the respondents reported that long-term residents who have a his-
tory of community activities become active in the community in the EZ process. 
Similarly, 71% of the respondents reported that newcomers to the area became ac-
tive in the Empowerment Zone projects. A Cameron sub-zone member reported that Winter 
Texans, elderly retired people that migrate from the north each year to spend winters in 
Texas, were also very involved. 
Our volunteers at the library, and the volunteers assisting at the boy and girls 
club are recent arrivals. Most of them, and we have sort of aroller-coaster 
operation. When the winter Texans are here, surprisingly, we have volun-
teers that never fail to come back and help immediately: "Hey, I'm back, I'm 
going to do this." 
All indications from interviews suggest that the outreach activities helped to generate 
citizen participation in the designated sub-zones. It is important to clarify that the citizen 
participation I am referring to deals directly with the implementation of Rio Grande Valley 
Empowerment Zone sponsored community projects. 
Community-Based Partnership-In Implementation 
The outreach activities, according to the majority of respondents, successfully 
reached citizens and increased the level of citizen participation in the Rio Grande Valley 
Empowerment Zone without precedent. Yet we also have to consider whether the outreach 
activities were equally helpful in securing institutional partners in the development proc-
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esses. Institutional partners offer the potential funding and logistical support necessary for 
the EZ-sponsored projects and programs to be sustainable. All but one of the respondents 
could point to at least one example of where non-governmental, non-profit organizations or 
local and state government or business and industry in the area cooperated with the 
Empowerment Zone. One Cameron Board member summarized the new partnerships se-
cured by the Empowerment Zone. 
The Empowerment Zone didn't build the one million dollar Boys and Girls 
Club; the Empowerment Zone funds were like $350,000.00. H.E.B. Corpora-
tion put in $115,000.00. Meadows Foundation put money in, over 
$100,000.00. Economic Development Council put money in; the city put 
money in and provided the site. 
Another participant offered similar insight into how acommunity-based partnership facilitates 
citizen participation and generates the support necessary to breathe life into community 
projects: 
I go back to this area, which is in the county well. It's in the unincorporated 
area. It's not a colonic, because they have water and they have wastewater, 
but it's a very low income, very poor area. And they have gotten actively in-
volved in all the decision-making. Again, we had the community meetings. 
Of course, one of the things we have down here, which we proved to be posi-
tive, is Valley Interfaith. They had an organization in place...lt's been very 
helpful having them in place, so they could work through the churches and 
the people in the area, to educate and to get them involved. And out of that 
we see now the so-called leaders and people in the community feeling very 
comfortable coming here and sitting where you are, talking to me and inter-
acting in other situations, so in my opinions, it's been very positive. 
Two-thirds of the respondents reported that persons associated with universities, 
health service providers, and local government urban/regional planners had participated. A 
Cameron County board member's response best illustrates the involvement of individuals 
from outside the Empowerment Zone. 
We got lots of help from Carlos in Cameron County with a lot of good ideas, 
particularly on housing. He's a planner for the city of Brownsville in Cameron 
County. We got a lot of help from the Community Development Corporation 
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of Brownsville and the, Brownsville Community Health Services, Texas A&M, 
and Pan-America University. 
Finally the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone demonstrated that by November 
1998 it had successfully secured a high number of community-based partnerships, as indi-
cated in Figure 5.3. 
Number of Community- Based Partners-Nov 98 
5 
Figure 5.2 
~ D State Partners 
®Market Partners 
~ Civil Society Partners 
Summary 
In their owns words the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone Board of Director 
representatives describe how the change in the composition of governing board generated 
more positive community outreach attitudes and activities and in turn helped to facilitate 
more citizen participation and community-based partnerships with respect to implementa-
tion. 
~9 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
One of the principle values of a case study is that the lessons learned can be applied 
to other similar social situations. I hope that insights gained through the study of the Rio 
Grande Valley Empowerment Zone have transferability to other cases. Whether the impetus 
comes from a community desire to improve local economic development, or to enhance 
management of natural resources, either scenario could benefit from social organization ex-
amples engaged in the Empowerment Zone. 
Lessons Learned 
Through interviews of key figures instrumental in the creation and present functioning 
of the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone, I attempted to answer the following research 
question. How do same persistently poor rural communities gain resident and community 
cooperation for community-based antipoverty programs? I analyzed the southern Texas 
region because of the initiative's goal to empower communities on the implications, given 
the region's deeply rooted "old-boy" system (compadrismo). From my experience as a de-
velopment professional, this region portrays the social dynamics of persistently poor com-
munities. Resources necessary to begin to address community needs exist. However, the 
emergent cultural capital blocks the community's ability to seize those resources, whether 
they be financial, social, cultural, environmental or political. The emergent cultural capital 
generated from the tradition of historical processes generates low expectations on behalf of 
those marginalized and stimulates those in decision-making roles to protect their vested in-
terests. Are these roles static? No not at all. But those roles are what we know and be-
come who we are. It is the cultural capital. It is the legacy of historical processes. 
The Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community initiative was designed to empower 
low-income people and persistently poor communities through partnerships of working to-
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gether to create the opportunity for sustainable community and economic development. The 
initiative offers nothing inherently new to the community development endeavor. The 
Empowerment model embodies the principles, assumptions and goals reflected in other 
models such as the Collaborative Problem Solving model (U.S. EPA Environmental Justice 
2003), the Peer Outreach Model (Divisions of HIV/AIDS Prevention 2003), etc. However, an 
important and unique difference is the funder's (in this case, USDA/Rural Development, Of-
fice of Community Development) flexibility. As a locality-based program, the Empowerment 
Zone/Enterprise Community initiative gave local citizens the opportunity to participate in im-
provised, unplanned ways, never before permitted by the traditional legacy system. Further, 
the money would not be forthcoming unless such participation was documented and moni-
tored. 
The Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone offers some important lessons. In the 
case of community and economic development, we need community participation. How is 
that community participation generated? By taking advantage of the initiative's flexibility, the 
Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone restructured their governing board to better reflect 
the range of community stakeholders. Through the participation of certain civil society dele-
gates, the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone's governing board was able to inadver-
tently shift from an old paradigm to a new empowerment paradigm governing structure. 
That achievement challenged the prevailing cultural capital in which the empowerment zone 
is embedded. The first key lesson is a need for the funder to insist that local people choose 
a broad, representative governing body and that they maintain legitimate and transparent 
relations with citizens and community-based groups. 
The Governing Board of Directors (GBD) recognized the need to become more in-
clusive. There was also pressure from USDA/Rural Development and local civil society to 
make sure that that happened. Outreach activities also reflected this effort. 
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The second key lesson is the need to improve access to and exchange of informa-
tion through active outreach activities. The Empowerment Zone improved the communities' 
access to and exchange of information. In part this reflects the broader representative 
GBD's consistent contact with the community stakeholders, through actively inviting local 
residents to community meetings to deliver presentations, offering guidance on grassroots 
organizing, and organizing open forums to express opinions and share ideas. 
Community ownership is critical to sustainable development process. The Rio 
Grande Valley Empowerment Zone through its outreach activities sought to increase the 
community base with respect to the implementation of activities to achieve their bench-
marks. In addition civil society partners such as Valley Interfaith were asked repeatedly to 
use their grassroots network and community leadership to motivate residents who normally 
were not involved to join implementation efforts. The third key lesson is the need to in-
crease the community base in the implementation process to encourage community owner-
ship. 
In reconstructing the history of the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone, my hope 
was to better understand the development process. In their own words, the respondents 
explained how the changing dynamics in the composition of governing board generated 
more positive community outreach attitudes and activities, which helped to facilitate more 
citizen participation and community-based partnerships with respect to implementation. 
Nonetheless, critics continue to suggest that community involvement and capacity building 
remain low. I agree the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone remains far from the ideal 
when speaking of community involvement and capacity building. However, we must take 
into consideration that cultural capital is not washed away like a sand castle in high tide. To 
the contrary, it is a slow process. In that context, the Rio Grande Valley Empowerment 
Zone has initiated the process to change cultural capital with respect to governance issues, 
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transparency, empowerment, citizen participation, community-based partnership and com-
munity development as more than economic development. 
Suggestions for Further Study 
I recognize various limitations in this particular case study, beginning with the rela-
tively small number of key informants interviewed. More intensive fieldwork that includes 
other methods of data gathering such as more observation, community focus groups, and 
staff surveys would generate a more robust knowledge base. It would also be useful to in-
terview the collaborators and the funders in the EZ. I recommend research in any of the 
following areas: 
1. Replicate this study based on another Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community. 
2. Conduct a quantitative study to compare resident satisfaction between 
Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Community sites categorized as old paradigm or new 
empowerment paradigm governance structures. 
3. Conduct a study of the effectiveness of the Empowerment Zone/ Enterprise Commu-
nity in serving educational, cultural, environmental, economic and social needs. 
4. Conduct a_study of the leveraging of community funds (i.e. Civil Society, Market, and 
State). 
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Appendix A. —Interview Schedule 
Hello. My name is  I work with the North Central Regional Center for 
Rural Development at Iowa State University, and we are funded by the US Department of 
Agriculture to collect data on the Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities for 
Round 1. 
I will be asking you a series of questions about the Empowerment Zone and its progress. 
Especially what you have observed in terms of a shared vision, formation of partnerships, 
kinds of participation, and poverty reduction. If you do not mind, I would like to tape our 
conversation in case I miss anything when I am taking notes, I can refer to this. 
1. Please describe your involvement with the empowerment zone. 
2. Getting the designation of an empowerment zone takes a lot of effort on the part of a lot 
of people. Do you know of other occasions when the community came together to make 
things happen? 
3. How would you describe the original strategic visions and the values of the 
empowerment? 
4. What changes have you observed in the strategic vision? 
5. Are the values and the overall vision still valid today? 
6. Could you give me some examples how the day to day activities of the empowerment 
zone reflected strategic vision? 
7. How has the empowerment zone encouraged citizens to play an active role in local gov-
ernmental issues? Can you give examples? 
8. How has the empowerment zone shown concern for those who are poor? Can you give 
examples? 
9. Can you give examples of local and state governments/non-profit and nongovernmental 
organizations/business and industry cooperated with the empowerment zone? 
10. What criticisms have you heard governmental officials express about the empowerment 
zone? 
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11. What praise have you heard governmental officials in the area express about the 
empowerment zone? When did you first become involved in community development 
activities? 
12. Why did you get involved? 
13. What changes have you seen in the number of empowerment zone area residents who 
volunteer or participate in community activities? 
14. Have you observed geographic areas within the empowerment zone where residents 
participate more or less than others? 
15. How many individuals from outside the empowerment zone area have helped implement 
the empowerment zone strategic plan? 
16. Do you find that meetings are held at convenient times? 
17. Do you find that the meetings are held at convenient places? 
18. Has anyone mentioned to you that they have been unable to attend the empowerment 
zone meetings or events due to time and place? 
19. Have you noticed new comers to the area become active in the empowerment zone 
projects or leadership? 
20. Have you noticed long-term residents who have a history of community activism been 
active in the empowerment zone effort? 
21. Have you noticed long-term residents not previously active in the community become 
active as a result of the empowerment zone effort? 
22. How important is it to involve all persons and groups in the community, in community-
based poverty reduction and community development efforts? 
23. How has the empowerment zone tried to include more persons and groups of the com-
munity within its decision-making process? 
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24. What have you observed the empowerment zone do to reduce poverty? 
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Appendix B. —Amendment to Bylaws 
~ K.~.S{~~ L~~ t~I(}N b~- the ~c7srJ ~}c ~~re=:ors ~)i .ne ~~ ~ :: anc~e 
~i1C~: ~.•nov~~~e-mCnt .~~nC ~ o!-tac)raclon .aopro~~ins~ 3nc~ 
sutnvr7z:n>? tnr ~ec:stlon ,~t .:n ~nC^c~rnC^c .o acs 3~•ta~~-~ 
`~~-~HER~.~ ~. :he i~o c.~rancie 'v' ~.i 1zv E:noc}we:TTtC:it LonC ~ ort~orac~on 1 "`one "~ o 
resolution has ~e: -eases ;he -~umbC- ~~t ~iirec:ors to ninC. 3na 
aric:e ,: 1 1 ot• :he $Maws o[ the done pro~iae .~ quorum for th 
t~nsacion of ~uslnCss ~v lhC $oars ~t ~trec:or5 ~s ~ _.! otree:ors: 3na 
'~~-f~~.~.~. ~~ue to resuc:ic~n a~~ the 3oara oc~ ~ire~:ors .o :71nC 01 slre:.:ors :h 
$c~~i,ru .}[ ?irC~:or~ )t 'hC ~Jne ,~es~re :o ~lec-Crse :nC auc)rum ~corn ~C•••e^ ~' otre~:OrS :~ 
' i ~~ e ~ ` ~ •1 t rC ~ :Ors 
-?~iC.0 ~ J~' :~'1C $~~l3~"S .~ '1C''C~~ .ltnC'2UC'.2 .:S"tt: 'C~:3(C:~ .t~ << ~:'tG1fC:'~ 
,. 
C':e;::I~~'. ;i"U~ 1aEC. ..L~ :oilv~~C 
_ ~ ~ l,I d ["Ll LII : .~ a ~ U r`1'C~' ` t? t e : ~ ! 11 { 'T'! C C' : n ~ ~ •) ! .n C ~ ~ ):arC.I ~ ! 
~tre~:ors ;1~.~e ~ ! ~ ~~rC:::or'S shad `?flStitUtC 1 JUUtum 'or •~C ~n~:`s~::on ~r 
~u5~ne5S ~C .iC: oI .~ :ZI3lof~lCv of ChC 1~re:::ors resent ~t .ins ^~C~:.n~ 1c 
~~. rt~c:;; 1 .~tsc3r-turt .s ~re5e:~t ~rial1 oC tt~C ~t : ~! :tiC ~3aru .t r ~~re:. ~~:r: _ ~,: ~ ~ ~ 
,:` ~thC'=~tSC ~C~:fiL~t~~' ^rC;4'tc1~.: ~~ ~;3t4tC )f ^t 'f1C -'."':~:C` . 
n ~ ;~ tau t 1 [ I t~ n ~ ~ t' ~ ~' :.~'} C Se $ ~~ ~ ~ « 5 : i .: ~ uU r'uSTl . = ~ U t ; rC ~ C;'1 t 1 t .: ":': C _ :: n 
•3c nC $oaro ~.3t ~~rec:or5. ;hC slre~:v!•~ }?CeSC'lt .~'1C:'C~t :T13~ .:t:tuc3.ITI :,etc 
TI~CC :i n~ ~'O tTt ; i i'fl C z0 t Itfl z. wt Ct1 V u t n V t I L C V thC' tllai'i 3tLn V t.:,rt L C ::'i C :1 t 1 t :.ri C 
:~neean~. untii 3 ~auorum cs prese:~c 
v c.} 
C 1nt1C:'St~•".'1CJ ,~ .2!'t )t~CC' )i :hC ` .)f'JUC~t;Uft :I1c1 r`;C~::teS .hC ~:Z~1.1't~C n ':'3C ~ t•t3uc 
~c~ ~~Zs ti DE ~~ -~.L~.i~ Y' ~~lP~~~~~..~tE~ ~ 
c c ~R.,°c~~Z~.'ita~v 
`~ ~nc~ `~" ~•~~r~C ' ~~r~C ~' ~az~l~ 
98 
Bibliography 
Aigner, S.M., C.B. Flora, and J.M. Hernandez. 2001. "Empowering Sustainable 
Communities: The Premise and Promise of the Empowerment Zone/Enterprise 
Community Initiative." Sociological Inquiry, 71(4), 493-507. 
Aigner, S.M., C.B. Flora, S.N. Tirmizi, C. Wilcox. 1999. "Dynamics to Sustain 
Community Development in Persistently Poor Rural Areas." Community Develop-
mentJournal, 34(1), 13-28. 
Anders, E. 1999. "Boss Rule." The Handbook of Texas Online. 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles (November 20, 2003). 
Bourdieu, P. 1986. "The Forms of Capital." Pp. 241-258 in Handbook of Theory and Re 
search for the Sociology of Education edited by John G. Richardson. New York, NY: 
Greenwood Press. 
Bunea, A. 2001. "Economic Development: By Default or Design." Unpublished paper 
presented at the 4th European Historical Economic Society Conference. 
http://www.eh.net/EHES/proceedings2001.html (November 20, 2003). 
Bursik, R. 1988. "Political Decision-Making and Ecological Models of Delinquency: Conflict 
and Consensus." In S. Messner, M. Krohn, and A. Liska, Theoretical Integration in 
the Study of Deviance and Crime. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Bursik, R. and H. Grasmick. 1993. Neighborhood and Crime: The Dimensions of 
Effective Community Control. New York, NY: Lexington Books. 
Bursik, R. and H. Grasmick. 1995. "Neighborhood-Based Networks and the Control 
of Crime and Delinquency." Pp. 107-130 in Crime and Public Policy: Putting Theory 
to Work edited by Hugh Barlow. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Cohen, C. and M. Dawson. 1993. "Neighborhood Poverty and African-American Politics." 
American Political Science Review 87: 286-302. 
Coleman, J. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." American Journal of 
Sociology. 
Duncan, C. 1999. Worlds Apart: Why Poverty Persists in Rural America? New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Ellerman, D. 2001. Helping People Help Themselves: Towards a Theory of Autonomy-
Compatib/e Help. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
99 
Etzioni, A. 1988. The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics" New York, NY: Free 
Press 
Fetterman, D. 1989. Ethnography Step by Step. Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
Flora, C., J. Flora, & S. Fey. 2003. "Cultural Capital." Chapter 2 in Rural Communities: 
Legacy and Change, 2"d edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Flora, J. 1999. "Globalization, Social Capital and Community (unpublished document)." 
Professor, lawa State University. 
Frank, A.G. 1978. Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment. New York, NY: 
Doubleday &Company, Inc. 
Gall, M., W. Borg, & J. Gall. 1996. Educational Research (6th ed.). New York, NY: 
Longman. 
Gaventa, J. 1980. Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an 
Appalachian Valley. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. 
Gittell, R. and A. Vidal. 1998. Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a 
Development Strategy. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Books. 
Granovetter, M. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology 
78: 1360-1380. 
Greenberg, S.N. 2002. "White Primary." The Handbook of Texas Online. 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles (November 20, 2003}. 
Havens E. and W. Flinn. 1970. "Introduction: Internal Colonialism, Structural 
Change, and National Development." Pp. 3-18 in Internal Colonialism and Structural 
Change in Colombia edited by A.E. Havens and W. Flinn. New York, NY: Praeger 
Publishers. 
Hechter, Michael. 1975. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National 
Development: 1536-1966. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Hodgson, G. 1995. "Varieties of Capitalism from the Perspectives of Veblen and Marx." 
Journal of Economic 29(2): 575-784. 
Johnson, D. 1972. "On Oppressed Classes." Pp. 269-301 in Dependence and 
Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy edited by J. Cockcroft, A. 
Frank and D. Johnson. Garden City, NY: Doubleday &Company, Inc. 
Kasarda, J. and M. Janowitz. 1974. "Community Attachment in Mass Society." 
American Sociological Review 39: 328-339. 
Kearney, M. & A. Knopp. 1995. Border Cuates: A History of the U.S. -Mexican Twin Cities. 
Austin, TX: Eakin Press. 
goo
Kornhauser, R. 1978. Social Sources of Delinquency. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
LeBlanc, M. 2001. Poverty, Policy, and the Macroeconomy (ERS Technical Bulletin No. 
1889). Washington, DC. Economic Research Service-U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture. http://www.ers.usde.gov/Publications/tb1889/ (November 20, 2003). 
Love, J. 1989. "Modeling Internal Colonialism: History and Prospect." World Development 
17(6): 905-922. 
McKay, R. 2002. "Mexican Americans and Repatriation." The Handbook of Texas Online. 
http://www.tsah.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles (November 20, 2003). 
Merry, S. 1981. Urban Danger: Life in a Neighborhood of Strangers. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
Miraglia, E., R. Law, & P. Collins. 2003. "What is Culture." Learning Commons Fundamental 
Learning Topics Online. 
http:/Iwww.wsu.edu:8001/vcwsu/commons/topics/culture/culture-definition.html (No-
vember 20, 2003). 
Montejano, D. 1999. Anglos and Mexicans in the Making of Texas, 1836-1986. Austin, TX: 
University of Texas. 
Narayan, Deepa. 1999. "Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty (Policy Research 
Working Paper 2167)." World Bank-Poverty Division. 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlt/V1/DSContentServer (November 20, 2003) 
Peled, Y. 2000. "Ethnic Democracy and Cultural Division of Labor: Competing or 
Complementary Models of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Formally Democratic Societies? 
Tel Aviv University: www.bgu.oc.il/humphrey/seminar/yoavpeled.html {November 20, 
2003) . 
Peluso, N., C. Humphrey and L. FOrtmann. 1994. "The Rock, the Beach, and the Tidal Pool: 
People and Poverty in Natural Resource-Dependent Areas." Society and Natural Re 
sources 7: 23-38. 
Pones, A. 1998. "Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology." Annual 
Reviews Sociology Vol. 24: 1-24. 
Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University. 
Rio Grande Valley Empowerment Zone Corporation. 1998. Executive Summary. Mercedes, 
TX: http://www.ezec.gov/ezec/tx/riogrande.html (November 20, 2003). 
Sampson, R. 1987. "Communities and Crime." Pp. 91-114 in Positive Criminology, edited by 
M. Gottfredson and T. Hirshi. Newbury Park: Sage Books. 
101 
Sampson, R. 1988. "Local Friendship Ties and Community Attachment in Mass Society: A 
Multilevel Systemic Model." American Sociological Review 53: 766-779. 
Sampson, R. and W. Wilson. 1995. "Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequal 
ity." Pp. 37-54 in Crime and inequality edited by J. Hagan_ and R. Peterson. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Sennett, R. 1970. The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity &City Life. New York, Knopf. 
Sherraden, M. 1991. Assets and the Poor: A new American Welfare Policy. Armonk, NY: 
M. E, Sharpe. 
Shils, E. 1975. Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology. Chicago, IL: The Univer 
sity of Chicago Press. 
Teja, Jesus F. 2002. "Texas in the Age of Mexican Independence." The Handbook of Texas 
Online. www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles. 
Texas Association of Counties. 2003. County Official Information Description of Office. 
http://www.county.org/counties/desc office/commiss.asp (November 20, 2003). 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 1993. Building Communities Together: The President's 
Community Enterprise Board. Washington, D.C.: USDA. 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 1998. Building Communities 
Together: Strategic Planning Guide. Washington, D.C.: HUD. 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2003. "Collaborative Problem-Solving Grants Pro 
gram. 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/grants/ej-cps-grants.html (No 
vember 21, 2003). 
Verdery, K. 1979. "Internal Colonialism in Austria-Hungary." Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2(3): 
378-399. 
Veysey, B. and S. Messner. 1999. "Further Testing of Social Disorganization Theory: An 
Elaboration of Sampson and Grove's Community Structure and Crime." Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency 36(2) :156-174. 
Vigness, D. & Odintz M. 2002. "Rio Grande Valley." The Handbook of Texas Online. 
http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles (November 20, 2003). 
Vogt, W.P. 1999. Dictionary of Statistics &Methodology. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
Wacquant, L. and W. Wilson. 1989. "The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner 
City." Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501: 8-25. 
Walls, D. 1978. "Internal Colony or Internal Periphery? A Critique of Current Models and an 
102 
Alternative Formulation." Pp. 319-349 in Colonialism in Modern America: The Ap 
palachian Case edited by H. Lewis, L. Johnson and D. Askins. Boone, NC:The Ap 
palachian Consortium Press. 
Warner, B. 1999. "Whither Poverty? Social Disorganization Theory in an Era of Urban 
Transformation." Sociological Focus 32(1): 99-113. 
Warner, B. and P. Wilcox Rountree. 1997. "Local Social Ties in a Community and Crime 
Model: Questioning the Systemic Nature of Informal Social Control." Social Prob 
lems 44(4): 520-537. 
Weber, M. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York, NY: Free 
Press. 
Wilson, W. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City the Underclass, and Public Pol 
icy. Chicago, IL. University of Chicago Press. 
